注释
第一篇 文艺复兴时期的军事状况
1 欧洲现代步兵的建立
1.The standard monograph is “The Battle of Guinegate”（“Die Schlacht bei Guinegate”）by Ernst Richert. Berlin dissertation，1907.
2.Dadizeele, Mémoires, ed. Kerwyn de Lettenhove, p.19. According to Comines, there were 200 noblemen.
3.All the earlier works and studies on the lansquenets have been superseded by the book by Martin Nell, The Lansquenets, Origin of the First German Infantry（Die Landsknechte, Entstehung der ersten deutschen Infanterie），Berlin，1914. This work is exemplary in its penetrating study and perspicacious critique. The first part was published as a Berlin dissertation. The author, who was justified in having the finest hopes for the future and looked on life with youthful trust, fell on the field of honor in France in 1914.
Erben, Historische Zeitschrift，116：48，had a few reservations concerning Nell"s conclusions, which we can agree with, but they do not eliminate anything of importance.
4.In the first seven documents in which the name appears, Nell found that it was written twice as “Lanzknechte，” twice in the Swiss minutes in 1486 as “landtsknechte，” and three times as “lantknechte.”
5.Lilienkron，2：362，20.
6.Hobohm treats this more thoroughly in Machiavellis Renaissance der Kriegskunst，2：394，with the references at 2：405. I cannot agree with Nell"s interpretation.
7.Hobohm，2：426 ff.，basing his opinion on Jovius, has expressed the belief that the Swiss spear was initially only 10 feet long and was gradually lengthened to 17 or 18 feet as the squares of spearmen fought against one another. Nell, p.158，observed that the lengthening of the spear must therefore have started in 1483. Presumably the spears never had a “normal” length but had always been of greatly varying lengths.
8.“Studies on the Long Spear”（“Studien über den Langen Spiess”），Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，4（1908）：301.
9.Böheim, in the Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，1：62.
10.The work appeared in Venice as early as 1496. I am using the version reprinted in Eccard, Corpus Historicum, II，1612. I do not wish to present the above translation as completely confirmed. The expressions used by the author are not absolutely clear, even though he was an eyewitness. An Italian translation（Venice，1549）does not shed any more light on the matter. Jähns，1：727，has interpreted this not as a wheeling movement but a caracole. Because of these uncertainties, I quote the original text here：
Ab his phalanx una peditum Germanorum erat, quae omnium oculos in se convertebat, quadratae figurae, quae VI M.peditum continebat, Georgio Petroplanensi Duce integerrimo, in equo eminente. In ea acie tympanorum multitudo audiebatur germanico more, quibus aures rumpebantur; hi pectore tan-tum armato incedebant per ordines primo a posteriore parvo intervallo. Primi longiores lanceas in humeris ferebant, infesto mucrone sequentes lanceas erectiores portabant post hos bipennibus et securibus armati; ab his signiferi erant, ad quorum inclinationem agmen totum ac si una rate veherentur, in dextrum, laevum, retro regrediuntur; a tergo pilularii dicti parvorum tormentorum; hos a laeva et sinistra scorpionum Magistri sive manubalistarii sequuntur. Hi in conspectu Beatricis Ducis quadratum agmen uno signo in cuneum subito commutavere, paulo post in alas sese divisere: demum in rotundum altera tantum parte levi motu, altera cursim movebant, prima parte circumacta, postrema immota, ita ut unum corpus esse videretur.
11.Jahrbücher für Schweizer Geschichte，6：263. Basin: “Surrogavit enim in eorum locum alios pedites, quos appellabant halbardurios, qui similibus armis induti ut franci sagittarii, loco arcuum contos longos ferratos, quos Flamingi piken appellant, aut latas quasdam secures, secundum Alemannorum peditum ritum, deferebant”（“For he put other infantry in their place, whom they call halberdiers. These, similarly equipped to French archers, carried instead of bows long iron-tipped poles, which the Flemish call pikes, or broad axes following the custom of German infantry.”）
12.Hobohm，2：329，345.
13.According to Spont, Revue des Questions Historiques，1899，p.60.
14.According to Susane, Histoire de l"infanterie française，1：14.
15.Proof based on the sources is to be found in Willibald Block，“The Condottieri: Studies on the so-called‘Unbloody Battles"”（“Die Condottieri. Studien über die sogenannten‘unblutigen Schlachten’”），Berlin dissertation，1913.
16.Hobohm，2：336.
2 火器
1.From the abundant literature on the invention of gunpowder and the oldest firearms, I mention the following works: Napoleon III, Du Passé et de l"Avenir de l"Artillerie. This work, which was written during the imprisonment of Louis Napoleon in Ham, is still worthy of note today. With a certain amount of abridgment and the omission of notes and tables, it was copied in the Oeuvres de Napoléon III, Vol.IV，1856，and was translated by Lieutenant（later Lieutenant General）H. Müller, Berlin，1856. A. Essenwein, Sources on the History of Firearms. Facsimile Illustrations of Old Original Drawings, Miniatures, Wood Cuts, and Etchings, together with Photographs of Authentic Old Weapons and Models（Quellen zur Geschichte der Feuerwaffen. Faksimilierte Nachbildung alter Originalzeichnungen, Miniaturen, Holzschnitte und Kupferstiche nebst Aufnahmen alter Originalwaffen und Modelle）. Published by the Germanic National Museum. Text by A. Essenwein. With 213 facsimile illustrations. Leipzig，1872-1877. Thierbach, M.，The Historical Development of Hand Firearms（Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Handfeuerwaffen），Dresden，1886. Supplement，1899. Köhler, G.，The Development of the Military System and Warfare in the Knightly Period（Die Entwicklung des Kriegswesens und der Kriegführung in der Ritterzeit），Vol.III, Breslau，1887（probably the most valuable part of this broadly conceived work）. Romocki, S.J. von, History of Explosives（Geschichte der Explosivstoffe），Vol.I, Berlin, Hanover，1898. Very valuable, especially because of its corrected reprint of Marcus Graecus. Jähns, M.，History of the Development of Old Offensive Weapons（Supplement on Firearms）（Entwicklungsgeschichte der alten Trutzwaffen[Anhang Feuerwaffen]），Berlin，1899. Sixl, P.，“Development and Use of Hand Firearms”（“Entwicklung und Gebrauch der Handfeuerwaffen”），Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde, I ff.，1899 ff. Reimer, P.，“Gunpowder and Ballistic Concepts in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries”（“Das Pulver und die ballistischen Anschauungen im XIV.und XV. Jahrhundert”），Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，1：164 ff. Also 4：367. Oskar Guttmann, Records of Gunpowder（Monumenta pulveris pyrii），London，1906. Karl Jacobs, The Development of Firearms on the Lower Rhine up to the Year 1400（Das Aufkommen der Feuerwaffen am Niederrheine bis zum Jahre 1400），Bonn, Peter Hanstein, publisher，1910. An excellent document that presents much more than the title indicates. Rudolf Schneider, in the Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde, Vol.6，Book 3，“A Byzantine Firearm”（“Eine byzantinische Feuerwaffe”）. See also in this connection the article by R. Forrer，“Archeological and Technical Aspects of the Byzantine Firearm of the cod. Vat 1605 c. Eleventh Century”（“Archäologisches und Technisches zu der byzantinischen Feuerwaffe des cod. Vat 1605 c.11. Jahrhundert”）in the fourth book of the same periodical（1909）. These two articles overtake Romocki"s work with completely new material.M. Feldhaus, in his Great Pages of Technology（Ruhmesblätter der Technik），Leipzig，191-[sic]，gives a valuable survey based on his own research. Recently, a new contribution in this field with very valuable new conclusions has been added by Rathgen（Lieutenant General）and Schäfer，“Firearms and Long-range Weapons in the Papal Army in the Fourteenth Century”（“Feuer-und Fernwaffen beim päpstlichen Heer im 14. Jahrhundert”），Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde, Vol.VII, Book 1，1915.
2.Schneider and Forrer, op.cit.
3.See Romocki, Geschichte der Explosivstoffe, for the best and most thorough treatment of this subject.
4.Romocki, p.31.
5.Under these circumstances, I may be permitted to pass over the question as to whether and to what extent gunpowder and firearms were known in ancient India. On this point see Oppert, Gustav，“On the Question of Gunpowder in Ancient India”（“Zur Schiesspulverfrage im alten Indien”），Mitteilungen zur Geschichte der Medizin und Naturwissenschaften，4：421-437.
6.Rathgen and Schäfer，“Feuer-und Fernwaffen beim päpstlichen Heer im 14. Jahrhundert.”
7.This work by Walter de Millemete is entitled De officiis regum（On the Duties of Kings）and was presumably written in 1325 or at the beginning of the reign of Edward III, that is, shortly after 1327. The manuscript is in Oxford. The illustration is to be found in Guttmann，figure 69，reproduced in the Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde and also, very unclearly, in Feldhaus, p.100. I handed my colleague, Tangl, the sample given in Guttmann, and he told me that no conclusion could be drawn from the passage. While he was certain it belonged in the fourteenth century, it was of the type of elegant writing which contains so little of an individual character that it is impossible to establish a closer date. But he went on to say that if the manuscript can be proved to stem from the years to which it has been attributed（1325-1327），then we may also assume that the illustration is from the same period. The fact that the projectile with the arrow point is aimed at the gate of a stronghold could perhaps be interpreted as indicating that we are dealing with a purely decorative composition that does not necessarily show firing against the strong gate. Shooting with bolts instead of balls was actually done.
8.The most important are two frescoes in the church of the former monastery of St. Leonardo in Leccetto near Siena, on which a siege with a cannon and a hand firearm are shown（Guttmann, p.28）. According to an account book, the master Paul was paid 16 L.，12 R. for these works in June 1343. Professor Tangl told me, however, that the writing in the account book is of a much later period.
9.On this point see the articles by Schneider and Forrer named in note 1 above.
10.Of course, Rathgen and Schäfer point out that in the papal accounts, as detailed as they are in other respects, there is no entry for wood for the blocks. They say, however, that these blocks may have been made on the spot.
11.According to Clephan，“A Sketch of the History and Evolution of the Handgun，”Festschrift für Thierbach, pp.35，40，gunpowder and various types of cannon are mentioned for the first time in England in 1338，in a procurement contract.
12.With respect to Meissen, see Baarmann in the Festschrift für Thierbach, p.67，where it is said that the defender of Salzderhelden successfully used a lead firearm several years earlier.
13.“On the Oldest Cannon in Switzerland, with a Document from the Year 1391”（“Ueber älteste Geschütze in der Schweiz, mit einer Urkunde vom Jahre 1391”），by Dr.J. Häne in Zurich.Anzeiger für schweizerische Altertumskunde, new series，2（1900）：215-222.
14.Jacobs, p.136.
15.Favé，3：80 ff.，according to Köhler.
16.The ribaudequins were originally large crossbows that were installed on the walls. In the fifteenth century they were often named as cannon. The most important passages are cited in Köhler, Kriegswesen der Ritterzeit，3：178，279，315.
17.In an extract from the Book of Pyrotechnics（Feuerwerksbuch）of 1429 it is already stated how “lump powder” was made and the fact that this powder was more effective than fine powder. Köster（p.336）and Jähns（p.401）believe that this lump powder was not yet a true granulation but only a preliminary step. Romocki, p.182，and Clephan, p.36，call it simply granulation. Clephan adds that, nevertheless, fine powder continued to be used for a long time and granulated powder was again used at the beginning of the sixteenth century. As the reason for this, he assumes, as does Köhler，3：255，that the explosion of the granulated powder was so strong that the weak cannon could not withstand it. This explanation is not very enlightening, since one could have used less powder.
18.G. Körting, Petrarch"s Life and Works（Petrarcas Leben und Werke），p.542，says that the poet devoted many years to this work but did not finish it until he was old—on 4 October 1366，according to a reliable source. Azzo died in 1362. This date is also accepted by Karl Förster, Petrarch"s Collected Canzonas（Petrarcas sämtliche Canzone, usw.），translation，2d ed.，1833，p.XI. This report is based on Baldelli, Del Petrarca e delle sue opere, Florence，1797.2d ed.，Fiesole，1837. Blanc, in Ersch and Gruber, III，19，p.237，reports that Petrarch started the work in 1358 and finished it in 1360. In 1360 or early 1361 he supposedly presented it to the Dauphin, later Charles V of France, on the occasion of a diplomatic mission, and Charles had it translated into French. Blanc also bases his statements on Baldelli, but Baldelli, in his second edition at any rate, names 1366 as the year of completion.
19.Published in Geneva by Jacob Stoer in 1645，p.302.
20.In the word “wooden”Jähns saw indirect proof of its derivation from the madfaa. That does not seem clear to me.
21.Jovius, Elogia virorum bellica virtute illustrium（Aphorisms of Men Distinguished by Military Virtue），Basel，1575，p.184. Also Guicciardini, Historia d"Italia, Venice，1562，4：100.
22.Jacobs, p.53.
23.Jacobs, p.51 ff.，p.136.
24.Napoléon, Etudes, p.66.
25.Baarmann，“The Development of the Gun Carriage up to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century and Its Relationship to that of the Rifle Stock”（“Die Entwicklung der Geschützlafette bis zum Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts und ihrer Beziehungen zu der des Gewehrschaftes”），Festschrift für Thierbach, p.54. A very valuable study. I cannot agree with the differing opinions in Essenwein and Gohlke（Geschichte der Feuerwaffen）. According to von Graevenitz, Gattamelata and Colleoni and Their Relationships to the Art（Gattamelata und Colleoni und ihre Beziehungen zur Kunst），Leipzig，1906，p.96，Colleoni placed cannon on mobile carriages and thereby became the creator of the field artillery in Italy.
26.Robertus Valturius, de re militari（On Military Affairs），Verona，1482，has a series of illustrations of cannon in Book X. Among them are also bombs with burning tinder, but in other respects the pictures are fantasies.
27.On his rapid march from Rome to Naples in 1495，Charles VIII bombarded the city of Monte Fortino so that it could be taken by storm（Pilorgerie, Campagne de 1494-1495，p.174）. The same procedure was repeated at Monte di San Giovanni（p.174）. Charles VIII himself gives testimony in a letter written on the day of the victory（9 February 1495）of “a bombardment of four hours.”During that time an extensive breach had been made（p.176）. In a letter dated 11 February, Charles refers to Monte Fortino as “one of the fortified places of this country famous for its strength.”He did not move out against this city until after the midday meal, and less than an hour after the first shot the attack had already succeeded（pp.177-178）. A letter from a high-ranking French officer from Naples, written in February 1495，states：“Our artillery is not large, but we have found more in this city and large stocks of powder. But we have a shortage of iron bolts because here they have only stones”（p.197）.—In the presence of the king the shooting was better—“Today the king went to dine with the artillery, and in short order the cannoneers fired so well that they knocked down a tower”（13 March 1495）.（Pilorgerie, Campagne de 1494-1495，p.211）.
28.Beck, History of Iron（Geschichte des Eisens），1：906，says that iron balls were among the earliest proof for the invention of iron casting and existed long before 1470，when Louis XI supposedly bought the secret from a German Jew（p.910）. On p.915 he even claims they go back to the beginning of the fifteenth century. But that certainly seems false. In those cases where iron balls are mentioned earlier, they may have been, as Beck himself says, forged balls, and the cast-iron balls that appeared toward the end of the fifteenth century were regarded as something entirely new. Jähns，1：427，cites the statement from an anonymous military book dated 1450 to the effect that stone balls were to be preferred because they were much less expensive than those of iron or lead. The high price, however, can hardly have been a decisive factor when we realize that, although the individual stone ball was much cheaper, the manufacture, transportation, and manipulation of the cannon that it required were all the more costly. The manuscript of a book on pyrotechnics that Jähns，2：405，places in the year 1454 recommends covering iron balls with cast lead. This can no doubt refer only to forged iron balls which were rounded off with the lead casting, something that could not be done easily by forging. This would therefore seem to be indirect proof that the casting of iron itself was not yet understood. A Nuremberg inventory of 1462 that is mentioned in Jähns，1：427，does not show iron cannon balls.
29.Liebe，“The Social Rank of Artillery”（“Die soziale Wertung der Artillerie”），Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，2：146.
30.De la Noue，26.Discours, Observations militaires, ed.of 1587，p.755.
31.Sello，“The Campaign of Burgrave Frederick in February 1414”（“Der Feldzug Burggraf Friedrichs im Februar 1414”），Zeitschrift für Preussische Geschichte，19（1882）：101.
32.Sello, p.101.
33.The last three examples are taken from the collected passages in R. Schneider, Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum，1909，p.139. The effectiveness of the giant Turkish cannon before Constantinople is pictured on the other side, however, as very strong. See Essenwein, p.34，and Jacobs, p.128 ff.
34.Rudolf Schneider, Anonymi de rebus bellicis liber，1908. Schneider，“Beginning and End of the Torsion Engines”（“Anfang und Ende der Torsionsgeschütze”），Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum，1909. Schneider, The Artillery of the Middle Ages（Die Artillerie des Mittelalters），1910. In these otherwise excellent writings I consider as erroneous what is said about the Carolingian period. The capitularies are not “laws，” but simple prescriptions for individual cases, and there is no proof that leverage engines did not exist at the time of Charlemagne. Consequently, nothing prevents us from considering that the passages from Paulus Diaconus and from the vita Hludowici（Life of Hludowicus）cited by Schneider, p.24 f.，refer to such leverage engines. There is no basis（p.61）for ascribing their invention to the Normans. Erroneous, too, is the rationale on p.22 for the inability of the scara to manufacture and use projectile weapons.
35.Rathgen and Schäfer，“Feuer-und Fernwaffen beim päpstlichen Heer.”
36.Jähns, p.429. Burckhardt, Geschichte der Renaissance in Italien, Sect.108，p.224，says that Federigo of Urbino（1444-1482）introduced low forts instead of high ones, since the cannon was less effective against the lower ones. Von Stetten, Geschichte von Augsburg，1：195 ff.，reports that, whereas in that city in the second half of the fifteenth century the very energetic work on the city fortifications still consisted of raising the height of the walls, with the turn of the century a clearly recognizable turnabout took place. Walls and towers were lowered to a certain height, strong mounds of earth were erected, the moats were deepened and “lined，” bastions and ravelins were installed, and so on. The law governing the radius became stricter and stricter; in 1542，despite the protests of the clergy, even a church was razed. For further information, see the considerations of Guicciardini in Historia d"Iitalia, Venice，1562，pp.388，425. According to this source, the conquest of Otranto by the Turks in 1480 and the reconquest by Duke Alfonso of Calabria in the following year were landmarks in siege warfare. De la Noue，18.discours，2. Paradox. Ed.1587，p.387. I shall go no further into the techniques either of fortification or of the attack; instead, I refer the reader to the corresponding sections in Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften. From a methodological viewpoint, it is interesting to see what kinds of exaggerations gain credence in something that is new and surprising. In his History of the Artillery, Napoleon III establishes the fact that Charles VIII in his campaign into Italy in 1494 transported 100 cannon of medium caliber and 40 heavy cannon. A whole series of authors, however, give him as many as 240 cannon and 2，040 field pieces, indeed as many as 6，000 light cannon. These exaggerations are due in part to copying errors and in part to the fact that the 6，000“vastardeurs”（pioneers, workers）who accompanied the army were misunderstood as cannon.
37.According to Sources for the History of Firearms（Quellen zur Geschichte der Feuerwaffen），p.100，the word “cannon” appears for the first time in a Spanish ordnance book of Charles V.
38.Guicciardini, Historia d"Italia，1：24. Jovius for the year 1515. Hist. Lib.XV，1：298.
39.von Ellgger, Military System and Military Art of the Swiss Confederation（Kriegswesen und Kriegskunst der schweizerischen Eidgenossen），Lucerne，1873，p.139.
40.Jovius lib. I for the year 1494 and lib.XV before Marignano.
41.The Swiss at Frastenz（Die Schweizer bei Frastenz）：Stettier，342，cited in Ranke, Werke，34：115. Valerius Anshelm, Bern Chronicle, Bern，1826，2：396. Jovius, Leben Gonsalvos, Venice，1581，p.292，at Cerignola in 1503. Likewise at Suriano in 1497：Jovius, Hist.lib.IV. At Marignano: Jovius, Lib.XV. At Ravenna in 1512: Jovius, Leben Leos, X，lib.II；Guicciardini, Historia d"Italia, lib.XI; Reissner, Leben Frundsbergs, Frankfurt，1620，fol.41-42. At Novara the Swiss supposedly fired with conquered French cannon they had turned around: Fleuranges, Mémoires, p.151.
The Venetian ambassador Quirini wrote the following description of the German battle square at the end of 1507:
... as soon as they see the fire of the cannon, the infantrymen automatically have to lift the halberds and long lances all together over their heads and to cross one lance over the other, and likewise the halberds, and at the same time to drop to the ground so low that the cannon, which do not fire downward, pass over them or hit in the halberds and long lances, not doing much harm to the infantrymen of the formation. For this reason, the Germans customarily now make the wheels of the gun carriages so small and low that the enemies can be harmed, even if they drop down as indicated; and when the formation is about to assault, the halberdiers and likewise those with the long lances all lower their halberds and also their long lances, with the points forward and not above their shoulders.（Relazioni degli Ambasc. Veneti [Reports of the Venetian Ambassadors]，Ed. Albèri, Series I，6：21-22）.
In 1537 de Langey taught that the best defense against the artillery was to take it by storm so that it would not have time for a second shot, or to approach it in a wide formation so that it would hit fewer men. Trewer Rath, fol. III, recommends having 300“runners”（including a few good musketeers）close quickly on the cannon.
42.“Nullo prope usui fore”（“It would be nearly useless”），Jovius, Hist. Lib. I, Venice，1553，1：30.
43.Book II, Chap.17. See also the account in Comines，2：258. Ed. Mandrot.
44.Essais, Book I.
45.Le vite de dicenove huomini illustri（The Lives of Nineteen Famous Men），Venice，1581，lib.III.
46.Avila, Schmalkaldic War（Schmalkaldischer Krieg），Venice，1548，p.40.
47.Sixl，2：167.
48.The name “hook firearm” was derived from this hook and survived for a long time, taking the form “haquebutte” in French. This word may also have been influenced by its similarity to “arkebuse”（harquebus）. Jähns, however, has surmised that the name “hook firearm” was derived from the hook into which the match was clamped, and this interpretation is actually supported by common sense. The invention of this “hook” represented a much more important step forward than the invention of the recoil hook. The latter, of course, could only be used in a prepared defensive position and in target shooting. The fork did not provide any resistance for the recoil; even a three-legged stand would have been too weak for that.
49.Sixl, Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，2：334，407，409，on the basis of firing reports from Zurich in 1472，Würzburg in 1474，Eichstädt in 1487，and others. In noteworthy contradiction to these is Guicciardini"s comment that before Pavia in 1525 the entrenched lines of the two sides were only 40 paces apart and the bastions were so close that the harquebus marksmen could have fired on each other. The greater distances in competitive shooting are so extensively confirmed that we cannot doubt them, but even if the paces were taken to be of the smallest possible length, it is still difficult to understand why they wanted to shoot at targets at such distances with the firearms of that period.
50.Forrer, Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，4：55.
51.Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，1：316.
52.Institution de la discipline militaire au Royaume de France, Lyon，1559，Vol.I, Chap.10，p.46. According to Jovius, Charles V suffered heavy losses in Algiers in 1541 because a rainfall extinguished the matches. A similar report appears in Vieilleville, Mémoires, Vol.Ill, Chap.22.
53.According to the Badminton Archery Book, by Charles Longman. London，1894.
54.Tielcke, Contributions to the Art of War and History of the War of 1756 to 1763（Beyträge zur Kriegskunst und Geschichte des Krieges von 1756 bis 1763），2：22.
55.The astonishing accuracy of the present-day Mongolians with the bow and arrow is reported by von Binder in the Militär-Wochenblatt，8（1905）：173. For the accomplishments with the bow and arrow in the Middle Ages, see Giraldus Cambrensis, cited in Oman, History of the Art of War, p.559. On the occasion of a siege, Welsh archers reportedly shot their arrows through an oak door 4 inches thick. Giraldus himself claimed to have seen in 1188 the arrows, which had been left in the door as a matter of curiosity. The iron points could just be seen on the interior of the door. An arrow was also reported to have penetrated a knight"s coat of mail, his mail breeches, his thigh, through the wood of his saddle, and deep into the flank of his horse.
56.Comines, Ed.Mandrot，2：296.
57.Escher, Neujahrsblatt der Züricher Feuerwerker，1906，p.23.
58.Ranke, Werke，2：269.
59.De vita magni Consalvi（On the Life of Gonsalvo the Great），Opere，1578，2：243.
60.According to the very careful and enlightening study by R. Forrer, Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，4：57.
61.Jovius, Elogia vir.ill.（Aphorisms of Distinguished Men），Book III.
62.Martin du Bellay as an eyewitness. Mémoires, Ed.1753，5：296.
63.See also Martin du Bellay, Mémoires, Ed.1753，Book X，6：35.
64.“Pistol”（“Pistole”）comes from the Slavic（Bohemian）“pistala”（tube，firing tube）. In a Breslau inventory of 1483 are listed 235 “Pis-deallen.” This number indicates that these were hand weapons, but we cannot tell what kind of weapon. Sources for the History of Firearms（Quellen zur Geschichte der Feuerwaffen），published by the Germanic Museum, Leipzig，1877，pp.46，112. The name of the weapon has nothing to do with the word “Pistoja.”
65.Susane, Histoire de la cavallerie française，1：48.
66.According to the Quellen zur Geschichte der Feuerwaffen, p.118，a pistol appears in an illustration dated as early as 1531；another pistol, with a wheel lock，“judging from its component parts and form，” is dated “approximately” in the second decade of the sixteenth century.
3 长枪方阵战术
1.We might be reminded of the battle of Sellasia, but the sources for that battle are much too uncertain. See Vol.I, p.241.
2.The Spanish theoreticians of the school of Alba—Valdes, Eguiluz, and Lechuga—favored a shallower formation for the infantry（Jähns，1：729 ff.）. At any rate, they preferred the square by space to the square of men, but they also favored an even shallower formation, going as far as a ratio of 1：7. Valdes gives as an example that Alba once formed his 1，200 spearmen, three terzios，60 men wide and 20 men deep.
Mendoza gives no positive prescription but simply mentions that they had both wider formations and deeper formations. In the Institution de la discipline militaire au Royaume de France, Lyon，1559，p.73，the space square, which has twice as many files as ranks, is prescribed.
3.The Italian Giovacchino da Coniano, who was a sergeant major in the English service against France in the 1540s, sketched and described a series of thirty-two battle formations. There were supposed to have been even more.（Comment by the editor at the end of the document: “It was entitled Dell"Ordinanze overo battaglie del capitan Giovacchino da Conjano, printed in Book III of the work Delia Fortificatione delle città di Girolamo Maggi e Jacomo Castriotto. Venice，1583，115 ff.）The whole work was already assembled in 1564.（See Maurice I.D. Cockle, A Bibliography of English Military Books Up to 1642 and of Contemporary Foreign Works. London，1900，pp.141，200.）Although the somewhat boastful soldier refers again and again to practical testing of his formations in the face of the enemy, we can probably not lend him too much credence. The accomplishments on the English side before Boulogne at that time did not evoke much respect elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the sergeant major was already sketching very shallow formations, with the justification that he had experienced how much better it was to have more weapons in the front line in action simultaneously（Fol.119-720）.
4 佣兵军队的内部建制
1.The standard document for this subject is the careful and worthwhile study by Wilhelm Erben，“Origin and Development of the German Articles of War”（“Ursprung und Entwicklung der deutschen Kriegsartikel”），in the Festgabe für Theodor Sickel, Mitteilungen des Instituts für"ostreichische Geschichtsforschung, supplementary Vol.VI，1900，with a few later additions by the same author. Closely linked with this work is the equally excellent book by Burkhard von Bonin, Bases of the Legal System in the German Army at the Beginning of the Modern Era（to 1600）（Grundzüge der Rechtsverfassung in dem deutschen Heere zu Beginn der Neuzeit[bis 1600]）. Weimar，1904. Also very important and providing good orientation by its comprehensiveness is the work by Wilhelm Beck, The Oldest Letters of Articles for the German Infantry（Die ältesten Artikelbriefe für das deutsche Fussvolk），1908. See Erben"s review in the Historische Zeitschrift，102：368.
2.“Weibel”（Feldwebel: first sergeant）is related to the word “weben”（“to weave”）and means the servant who moves quickly here and there, running back and forth. The Feldwebel was initially assigned by the colonel as responsible for lining up the whole regiment and only later gradually became a functionary for the company. The “Gemeinweibel，” who are supposed by some scholars to have been elected by the troops in order to present their possible complaints to the captain, seem to me somewhat questionable. On this point, see Bonin, p.50，and Erben, p.14.
3.Bonin, p.170，cites a few passages that indicate that the first sergeant was not to strike with his fist or with staffs, but with the shaft of his halberd. The captain and the lieutenant were supposed “to strike in their command duties with short sticks，” but “not without great reason therefor.”
4.Bonin, p.21.
5.Georg Paetel, The Organization of the Hessian Army under Philip the Magnanimous（Die Organisation des hessischen Heeres unter Philipp dem Grossmütigen），1897.
6.26.Discours. Observations militaires, Ed.1587，p.750.
7.Paetel, p.231.
8.Saxon Articles of War of 1546（Sächsische Kriegsartikel von 1546）. Published in the Militär-Wochenblatt, No.157，1909，by G. Berbig.
9.Eidgenössische Abschiede，3.1.599.
10.When the wars of religion started in 1562，the soldiers on both sides initially conducted themselves very properly. Among the Huguenots no swearing was heard, and no gambling or prostitutes were to be seen. The population was not bothered. But Coligny said at that time to de la Noue: “That will not last two months.” He was completely right. Furthermore, on occasion he took stringent steps and had robbers hanged. De la Noue, Discours 26，Observations militaires, Ed.1587，pp.681-686.
11.De la Noue treats these fraternal groups thoroughly. Discours 16，Ed.1587，p.352 ff.
12.Jähns，2：924.
13.S.C. Gigon, La troisième guerre de religion. Jarnac-Moncontour（1568-1569），p.376.
14.The Art of Dismounted War（Kriegskunst zu Fuss），pp.20-21.
15.For example, Georg von Lüneburg had no fewer than 1，200 Poles in his service in 1636.
16.Archives Oranien-Nassau，2d Series，2：275.
17.Archives, p.10.
18.Chemnitz, Swedish War（Schwedischer Krieg），Part IV, Book 2，p.141.
19.Pufendorf, B.19，Ed.1688，2：320. Apparently from Chemnitz.
20.Such a convention “de bonne guerre”（“of good war”）was signed by Gonzago and Brissac in 1553. Hardy, Histoire de la tactique française, p.463. Men-at-arms and private soldiers “will suddenly be released，” without having to pay, after they have been “dévalisés”—that is, disarmed and relieved of their possessions.
21.Kriegskunst zu Fuss, pp.16，22. Jähns，2：1018.
5 战例介绍
1.Hobohm，2：518.
2.This battle is thoroughly treated by Rüstow in History of the Infantry（Geschichte der Infanterie），by Jähns in Manual of a History of Warfare（Handbuch einer Geschichte des Kriegswesens），and by Ranke, History of the Romanic and Germanic Peoples（Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker），Werke，33：25. All these accounts, which differ significantly from one another, need serious correcting. Rüstow based his work too exclusively on Guicciardini, while Ranke and Jähns used as their principal source Coccinius, who can hardly be compared to the better sources. The standard study, based on the sources, is the Berlin dissertation by Erich Siedersleben（1907）. Published by Georg Nauck. His principal sources are a letter written by Fabricius Colonna, who commanded the knights on the Spanish side（printed in Marino Sanuto, Diarii，14：176. Venice，1886），and a report from the Florentine ambassador, Pandolfini, who was present at the battle in the French headquarters（printed in Desjardins, Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane，2：581.Paris，1861）.
3.According to Colonna"s letter.
4.The Italian survey map indicates that the ditch still exists today but does not extend as close to the Ronco as it did, according to our sources, at the time of the battle in 1512.
5.I include the 400 lances that were in position at the Ronco bridge under Alègre and intervened in the battle.
6.The artillery maneuver is not completely clear, since we cannot assume, as Guicciardini recounts, that Este drove completely into the right flank of the enemy, and the cannon certainly did not have enough range to shoot along the entire enemy front. Perhaps another inspection of the battlefield would clarify this point.
7.This battle is treated in two valuable monographs that appeared in quick succession: Novara and Dijon. Apogee and Decline of the Swiss Great Power in the Sixteenth Century（Novara und Dijon. Höhepunkt und Verfall der schweizerischen Grossmacht im 16. Jahrhundert），by Doctor of Philosophy E. Gagliardi. Zurich，1907. Published by Leemann Brothers and Co.“The Battle of Novara”（“Die Schlacht bei Novara”），by Georg Fischer. Berlin dissertation，1908. Published by Georg Nauck.
8.Gagliardi and Fischer arrange the individual elements of the battle very differently, indeed even contradicting one another, since Fischer places on the right flank what Gagliardi seems to report for the left flank. I agree with Fischer. Nevertheless, when Fischer assigns only 1，000 men to the north square of the Swiss，2，000 to the center square, and 7，000 to the south square, I do not say that that is impossible, but I do not consider it as certain. If the Swiss had good information on the enemy and knew that the lansquenets were in the southern part of the camp but that there was no favorable terrain there for horsemen, they may well have made the northerly and central columns of infantry very weak, assigning in return the horsemen to the former and the cannon to the latter. But they may have given these two units only missions calling for demonstrations, while assigning the actual attack exclusively to the third square and giving it seven-tenths of the entire infantry. But we may believe such fine points only if we have direct and reliable sources concerning them.Consequently, although I agree essentially with Fischer, I have expressed myself more carefully and with more restraint and have avoided giving specific numbers for the various troop units.
9.The sources speak of 400 Swiss halberdiers who reportedly first drove off the harquebusiers of the lansquenets and then attacked the main body in the flank. Gagliardi（p.162）considers them to be a unit that arrived by chance, while Fischer（p.138）considers this a detachment that was sent out intentionally. I suspect that these were men who welled out on one side when the main bodies clashed.
10.This battle is studied in an exemplary way by Otto Haintz in the dissertation “From Novara to La Motta”（“Von Novara bis La Motta”）. Berlin，1912.
11.This polarity is developed excellently by Gagliardi, Novara und Dijon, p.327.
12.The monograph by Heinrich Harkensee（Göttingen dissertation，1909），while also contributing to the research in detail, did not arrive at tactically correct concepts of the overall battle. The corrections that need to be made are apparent when this work is compared with the account above. In particular, Harkensee attributes too much credibility to the exaggerations in the figures for the French strength. Hadank"s review in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No.26，1910，concentrates too much on details and unjustly raises the accusation that the author did not understand the strategic situation. He may, however, be correct in his reckoning of the French strength as 30，000. He also justifiably defends the report that the Gascons had large shields that could be placed on the ground as a base. Such shields（pavesen）were used by the marksmen. He refers to a miniature showing crossbowmen with large shields of this kind in front of them. Hewett, Ancient Armour and Weapons，3：543（Supplement）.
13.On page 36 above there is a quote that praises the Swiss artillery. The facts do not justify this.
14.“The Battle of Bicocca”（“Die Schlacht bei Bicocca”），by Paul Kopitsch. Berlin dissertation，1909. Published by E. Ebering.
15.In Guicciardini the account reads：“They wanted to return home, but in order to show the whole world that it was not because of fear, they first wanted to defeat the enemy.”It is possible that this statement was made, but if they had been victorious, the Swiss would no doubt still have remained, and so they no doubt intended in the bottom of their hearts to do so from the start.
16.The standard monograph is the Berlin dissertation by Reinhard Thom（1907），which, as a result of precise source analysis, corrects many individual errors in earlier accounts. A few additional sources mentioned in the review of this monograph in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No.8，1909，are not of concern to us.
17.The report by the ambassador from Siena specifically gives this as the reason for the carelessness of the French.
18.Berlin dissertation by Karl Stallwitz，1911. Review by Hadank in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No.16，1912.
6 马基雅维利
1.Guillaume, p.165.
2.E. Fueter, in a review of Hobohm"s work in the Historische Zeitschrift，113：578，while recognizing the high value of the work, nevertheless takes exception in detail to many points, charges the author with a lack of methodological schooling and even insufficient knowledge of warfare and of the Italian language. I have checked on these accusations and have compared them with a handwritten countercritique by Hobohm. The result is that the reproach falls back on the critic. Even if all the details that he criticizes were real errors, in comparison with the stupendous scholarship and the critical perceptiveness with which Hobohm sweeps aside mountains of misjudgments appearing in the sources and constructs positive new knowledge, those errors would have very little significance. But my study shows that of all the objections and corrections made by Fueter, not even a single one—really not a single one—is justified. It is not that Hobohm"s understanding of Italian is insufficient, but rather that Fueter did not know the differences between modern Italian and the Italian of the sixteenth century. It is not Hobohm who introduces erroneous material concerning the warfare of that time but Fueter. Let us give but three examples: Machiavelli recommends that in the selection of corporals for the militia it should be taken into consideration that they are acceptable to the other conscripts（“scripti”）. Fueter is not familiar with this principle and this language. He claims he is bringing sense into this prescription by translating conscripts（“scripti”）with the word “instructions” and says that Hobohm, because of what is actually his correct translation of the passage, is unknowledgeable. Furthermore, Machiavelli recruited his militia exclusively from the peasants of the subjected countryside, and not from the burghers. Fueter read Hobohm"s book so hastily that he attributed to these peasants the attitudes of the “Florentine merchant nation.”
A third feature of Machiavelli"s militia system was the fact that Florence did its best, even though not always with success, to prevent its subjects from going off as mercenaries, whereas in Switzerland and Germany that was officially permitted and often even more or less organized. Fueter had such little understanding of these opposite attitudes, which are explained by Hobohm in a very interesting and thorough manner, that he believes Machiavelli borrowed the official regulations for sending men off for mercenary service from the Swiss military system, and he attempts to correct Hobohm in this matter with strong emphasis. And thus it continues point by point, and I can only regret that the Historische Zeitschrift has misled its readers on such a basic work.
3.Jähns，1：336.
4.Historia d"Italia, L.IX. Venice，1562，p.425.
5.Jovius, Elogia virorum bellica virtute illustrium（Aphorisms of Men Distinguished by Military Virtues），Basel，1575，p.323.
6.Hobohm，2：457，464. False army strengths for Novara and Marignano: Discorsi，2：18. Also Escher，“The Swiss Foot Troops in the Fifteenth Century and at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century”（“Das schweizerische Fussvolk im 15.und im Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts”），Neujahrsblätter der Züricher Feuerwerker，1904-1907，explains thoroughly that Machiavelli does not portray correctly either the armament or the formation of the Swiss.
第二篇 宗教战争时期
1 骑士向现代骑兵的过渡
1.George T. Denison"s History of the Cavalry from the Earliest Times, with Observations Concerning Its Future（Geschichte der Kavallerie seit den frühesten Zeiten mit Betrachtungen über ihre Zukunft），（German version by Brix, Berlin，1879）has no scientific-historical value.
2.Concerning the dispute over the explanation of the name, see Mangold in the Jahresbericht der Geschichtswissenschaften，3（1892）：247. The hussars are mentioned quite often in the Küstrin Battle Report on Mühlberg in Ranke, Werke，6：244-246，and in the report of the Nuremberg participant in the war, Joachim Imhof, in Knaake, Contributions to the History of Charles V（Beiträge zur Geschichte Karls V.），Stendal，1864，p.46. Of particular interest is Avila, History of the Schmalkaldic War（Geschichte des Schmalkaldischen Krieges），German edition, p.123. According to Susane，1：150，there had been Hungarian cavalry in France since 1635；in 1693 a regiment of hussars was formed.
3.See Jähns，1：498，concerning this book. Hauser, in Les Sources de l"histoire de France，2：25，rejects du Bellay as the author and says, probably correctly, that the edition of 1548 was the oldest（Jähns assumes 1535）. A very large part of the contents, but not the passage above copied from Vol.I, Chap.8，is taken from Machiavelli. See Gebelin, Quid rei militaris doctrina renascentibus litteris antiquitatis debuerit（What Military Doctrine Owed to the Renaissance），Bordeaux，1881，p.44.
4.Jovius, Book 44，Ed.1578，p.555.
5.Book 45，p.610.
6.Report of the Venetian Ambassador Navagero of July 1546（Bericht des venezianischen Gesandten Navagero vom Juli 1546），in Albèri, Series I, Vol.I, pp.314，328. He also describes the arms of these horsemen（p.314）. The pistol, which another report shows them as having（Ranke, Werke，4：223），is not yet mentioned in this report.
7.Alois Mocenigo, Relazione di Germania，1548. Ed. Fiedler, Fontes rer.austriacarum（Sources of Austrian History），30：120，Vienna，1870.
8.Vol.Ill, Book 3，Chap.2，p.289.
9.Jähns，1：740.
10.See the detailed extract in Jähns"Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften，1：474.
11.Jähns，1：521.
12.Napoleon III writes in his article entitled “On the Past and Future of Artillery”（“Du passé et de l"avenir de l"artillerie”），Oeuvres，4：200：
Saint-Luc says in his Observations militaires that the duke of Alba, having found the squadrons of the reîtres too deep, wanted to form his own men with their front twice as wide as their depth. In this way, supposing that each horse would occupy a space of 6 paces by 2，he estimated that a squadron of 1，700 horses in seventeen ranks would occupy a rectangle of 102 paces by 204.
The passage by Saint-Luc does not yet seem to have been printed.
13.Edited by Buchon, p.122.
14.That may be concluded from Discourse XV（Ed.1587，p.345），where it is assumed that a victorious squadron would still only directly throw back fifteen or sixteen of the enemy drawn up in line, that is, with a normal strength of 100，one-sixth or one-seventh of the total. See Discourse XVIII.
15.Napoleon III, in the work cited in Note 12 above, says that Henry IV had squadrons of 300 to 500 horses, which were drawn up in five ranks. He states that Montgomery required that the men-at-arms were to form in ten ranks and the light horse in seven. Billon, in Les principes de l"art militaire, German edition, p.254（1613），would have the squadron formed with a depth of five ranks，“for the horses do not press one another strongly.”
16.Georg Paetel, The Organization of the Hessian Army under Philip the Magnanimous（Die Organisation des hessischen Heeres unter Philipp dem Grossmütigen），1897. See especially pp.38，40. See also Jovius, Book 34，p.278，concerning Spanish armor.
17.According to the reports of the Venetian ambassador Alois Mocenigo, who accompanied the emperor. Fiedler, Fontes rer. Austriacarum，30：120. Venetian Dispatches from the Imperial Court（Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhof），published by the Historische Kommission der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna，1889，1：668，670-671.
18.They are first mentioned in Avila, Schmalkaldic War, German edition，1853，p.58. First edition, Venice，1548，p.34. In a letter dated 6 November 1552，Lazarus Schwendi refers to the horsemen of Albrecht Alcibiades as “black horsemen.”Voigt, Albrecht Alcibiades，2：8. In 1554，1，500“black horsemen” appear in the imperial camp before Namur, all with pennons on their lances. Anonymous Journal（1554-1557），edited by Louis Torfs, Campagnes de Charles-Quint et de Philippe II, Antwerp，1868，pp.23-24. There are numerous references in this journal to their mutinies. In 1554 there appears on the emperor"s side “un ost de reistres”（“a host of reîtres”）of 1，800 to 2，000 horses under Count Wolfram von Schwarzenburg. Rabutin, Commentaires L. VI, Ed. Buchon，1836，p.620：“In order to intimidate us, they had all made themselves black like handsome devils.”For the campaign of 1558，Henry II, looking back to the experiences of the previous year at St. Quentin, ordered the recruiting of as many reîtres as possible.
... because, the previous year, the largest strength that his enemy（Philip II）had and which was estimated as giving him the advantage, was by means of these reîtres, who have since been called “black armor，” all of whom being armed with pistols, furious and frightening firearms, seemed to have been invented for the amazement and the breaking up of the French men-at-arms. And yet, in order to take as many of them as possible away from his enemy and to accustom and teach the French how to use such arms with confidence, he wished to draw them into his service.
Rabutin, L. XI, Ed. Buchon，1836，p.738. The first German pistol men in French service appeared, as best I have found, in 1554（Rabutin, p.605）. Susane believes they appeared still earlier. Rabutin, p.701，makes a distinction in 1557 in the French army between men-at-arms, cavalry, and reîtres. The expression “horsemen”（“Reiter”）for cavalry, apparently with the intention of indicating something specific, appears in Marino Cavallis, Relazione da Ferdinando Re de Romani，1543. Ed. Albèri, Series I, Vol.III, p.122.
19.They are mentioned for the first time in an account of 1559，where they are given very little praise. Relation de Michel Suriano, made on the return from his ambassadorship to Philip II, in 1559. Gachard, Relations des ambassadeurs vénitiens sur Charles-Quint et Philippe II, Brussels，1856，p.116. Clonard，4：155，places their first mention in the Ordinanza of 1560.
20.History of the Netherlands War（Geschichte des niederländischen Krieges），Book II, Chaps.11，12.
21.Mocenigo reports to the doge on 4 September 1546：“The imperial mounted troops fear their enemies very much, both because of their numbers and their excellent horses and because many of them have three small wheel lock harquebuses, one on the saddle, another behind the saddle, and the third in a boot, so that it is said of these light horsemen that in skirmishes they always consider themselves secure, because having dealt with their enemies with one harquebus, they seize another, and many times, even when fleeing, they put it on their shoulder and fire to the rear.”Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhof, Vienna，1889，1：670-671.
A similar report is made by Federigo Badoero（Relazione di Carlo V e di Filippo II，1557. Ed. Albèri, Series I，3：189-190）about ferraruoli who were equipped with four or five pistols.
22.In the “Recollections of an Old Officer”（Feuilleton of the Post of 21 May 1890）we read：
At that time（1847），it was still the practice to target-shoot from horseback, a frightful maneuver during which very few horses stood still. A noncommissioned officer would hand the loaded pistol, provided with a fuse, with the greatest care to the mounted horseman. Now the horseman was to ride a volt, halt in front of the target, and fire. But as soon as the horse noticed that the rider had a pistol in his hand, he usually started to buck and jump, and the horseman, his mount, and the bystanders were all most seriously endangered. And it then sometimes happened that the horse was shot in the ear. But now it happened that our good first lieutenant, von B.，had an old sorrel mare named Commode, and whenever he was in charge of the practice firing, the whole platoon, one after the other, climbed aboard Commode, who stood quietly, and each man fired his shot accurately. Now this foolishness has been abandoned and the firing is done only in a dismounted position, although, of course, signal shots by mounted scouts are not excluded.
23.Wallhausen, Kriegskunst zu Pferde, p.6.
24.Mencken，2：1427.
25.Ed. Buchon, p.291. On Tavannes, see p.127，above.
26.I have just received a study by R. Friedrichsdorf on Albrecht as a leader of mounted troops（Berlin dissertation，1919）. It contains new and very valuable material.
27.In the second edition of this work, Basel，1572，the description is somewhat expanded（Book IX, Fol.309），but without adding anything of significance for us. Lancelot Voisin, Sire de la Popelinière, came from Poitou and was a student in Toulouse when the news of the blood bath of Vassy became public. He immediately took command of a Huguenot company of students, was eventually incapacitated as the result of a wound, and thenceforth he took up the pen.
28.In the account of the battle of Ivry, p.386. Since this battle did not take place until 1590，it is the younger Tavannes who is speaking here.
29.In the fourth chapter of Book 2 of his Kriegskunst zu Pferde, p.65，Wallhausen describes the execution of the caracole but without using that name. It is also described by Grimmelshausen in Simplizissimus, Ed. Gödecke，1897，Vols.10，11，p.36.
30.Brantôme, Oeuvres, Edit. Laianne，1864 ff.，4：201. See also 3：376. In Vol.I, pp.339-340，he mentions this example in the same sense and speaks of the battle of Aulneau（1 November 1587）as a parallel.
31.At the base of this is the Italian “corazza，” which is derived from “corium，”“leather.”
32.For example, Villar"s Mémoires, L.X.，Ed.1610，p.901；this appears to be for the year 1559，according to a contemporary document.
33.In the sixteenth century a certain Count Solms（Würdinger，2：371）wrote correctly—but in the final analysis nevertheless falsely：
When one has as horsemen only wagon servants and peasants who steal their horses from wagons and plows, there will be in the field bad conduct and desertion in battle and campaigns. And even if they do not flee but remain, they are still not sufficiently well mounted and armored, and they have not learned how to fight but they remain peasants on plowhorses and draft horses.Such men should not be brought by a noble to the lord who provides the pay, for the lord relies on their numbers without knowing that he has only a loosely formed, worthless unit.Every knightly man who intends to lead horsemen to a lord should ponder this, for it is a matter of his honor and his welfare. For if he has peasant yokels in his squadron or banneret and finds himself faced by a good, wellequipped unit, what can he expect to accomplish and what poor service he has provided his commander in return for his money.
34.Erben, Bulletin of the Imperial and Royal Army Museum（Mitteilungen des kaiserlichen und königlichen Heeresmuseums），1902，Articles of War, etc.
35.Susane, Histoire de la cavallerie française，1：73，gives a somewhat different origin of this armed branch. He does not relate it to firearms but regards as the significant factor only the speed that the infantry in general, both lancers and musketeers, could develop in this way during individual expeditions. Because of the terror that they inspired, these warriors had called themselves dragoons. They were created by the Marquis de Brissac in the Piedmont theater of operations between 1550 and 1560. According to Jovius, Book 44，Pietro Strozzi had already placed 500 selected marksmen（sclopettarii）on horseback in 1543 in order to occupy Guise as quickly as possible. Ludwico Melzo, Regule militari ... della cavalleria（Antwerp，1611）understands the dragoons to be mounted marksmen. Jähns，2：1050. Wallhausen has them armed in part with pikes.
Basta, Book I, Chap. 8，believes the mounted marksman or carabineer was invented in Piedmont. He identifies this type, therefore, with the dragoons. Hugo includes among the dragoons also men armed with spears, who move on horseback but fight on foot. Militia equestri，1630，S.184，Book III, p.4. See Book IV, Chap.5，pp.271-272，concerning their formation in battle, with the pikemen in the middle, marksmen on the right and left, and horses in the rear.
36.When, for example, the Venetian Soriano, Relazione di Francia，1562，Ed. Albèri, Series I，4：117，says that the king of France had, in addition to his knights, foreign ferraiuoli e cavalli leggieri, the latter principally Albanians and Italians, the difference is that here the cavalla leggieri are the older arm, which does not fight in such close formation whereas the ferraiuoli were grouped in tight squadron formation and at this time，1562，were probably also armed only with the pistol.
37.Rabutin, Commentaires, Ed. Buchon, p.573，as an eyewitness.
38.Aloise Contarini, Relazione diFrancia, February 1572，Ed. Albèri, Series I, Vol.IV, pp.232-233.
39.Ed. Buchon, pp.202-203.
40.“The formation of the French is with a broad front and weak rear, because everybody wants to take position in the front rank; but the Flemish, increasing the files and enlarging the body, make it stronger and more secure.”Report of Michel Suriano, made on his return from his ambassadorship to Philip II in 1559（Relation de Michel Suriano, faite au retour de son Ambassade auprès de Philippe II en 1559）（In Gachard, Relations des ambassadeurs vénitiens sur Charles-Quint et Philippe II, Brussels，1856，p.116）. Popelinière, Histoire des troubles, Livre 9（edition of 1572，p.309）：“The reître, because he fights in a completely different way than the French ...”
41.And the worst is that, in the past, they fought in a single line（en haye）. These regiments marching in battle formation are separated from one another by the foot troops, the artillery, or other units, and they cannot conveniently be drawn together to form a large unit when the occasion calls for it. And while they might still be in open country, if they should close together, if by chance the king"s lieutenant should not be there to command them, each of them wanting to show his worth, without considering that body of troops—or, so to speak, the mountain of enemies—that is coming to attack them, neither the fear the soldiers can have, who seeing themselves weak and outnumbered, run off, seeking not only to win, but to survive if they face up to these troops where they have a four to one superiority, united, pressed together, and in quantity, as it is said.
They were to make the companies 80 to 100 men strong, composed of compatriots who were all known to one another, in order to foster cohesiveness. The companies were to be formed in regiments of about 500 men（“hommes d"armes”）.
Cavalry in single line（en haye）is useless; squadrons composed of 400 riders are the best; squadrons of 1，500 and 2，000，as is prescribed for the reîtres, would defeat them if they were dealing only with these 400；and if there were 1，200 in three units, charging one after the other, I would consider them to have the advantage. So many men in close formation only create confusion, and only a fourth of them fight. This large number of soldiers in a squadron is useful for the reîtres, because three-fourths of their men are nothing but villeins. The first troops that charge against these large bodies throw them into disorder, principally striking them on the flank. And even if the body can hold off the first attackers, the second and third squadrons sweep them away and break them up, charging from one end to the other and passing through; after the first two ranks are penetrated, there is little danger from the rest. He who has the larger number of squadrons of 300 and 400 must win the victory. Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, Mémoires, Ed. Buchon，1836，p.328 ff.
42.I find a similar argument in a Venetian account of 1596：
The reîtres were easily broken up by the lances of the light cavalry.Formerly, when each rank had made its wheel, the reîtres customarily tightened their whole formation and awaited the assault, facing the lances that were coming toward them, and then, widening their formation, they would let them enter among them and would handle them roughly with their pistols and their arms. But now the lances no longer come all together in squadrons but, divided into diverse and small detachments, they assault the squadrons of reîtres from all sides and harass them and throw them back and run through them from one side to the other and break them up with great facility. Tommaseco Contarini, Relazione di Germania，1596. In Relazione degli Ambasc. Veneti.，Ed. Albèri, Series I，6：235.
43.It was a question in ancient times and among those of the present time whether it was better to go into combat at a trot or to await the enemy in place; it seems that the momentum and the gallop increase the power of the men and horses to mow down the squadrons but it also gives much more opportunity to those who have no desire to be involved in this charge to halt, hold their mounts in place, and separate themselves from the charge, such as new soldiers and those the captain does not trust. It seems that it would be better to have them wait in formation and firmly fixed in place or at least not to take up the trot or gallop before a distance of twenty paces from the enemy, because then those who would fall out would be recognized, and the cowards would be too ashamed to leave their position at the moment of encountering the enemy, being the more easily seen and recognized by their captains, who would force them to be courageous in spite of themselves. Jean Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, Mémoires, Ed. Buchon，1836，p.116.
44.French ordinance of 16 October 1568.“It is likewise ordered that the companies of each regiment of cavalry will march together and in the formation that they are to maintain while fighting, in order that each man will be accustomed to holding his position.”Nothing further was prescribed. H. Choppin, Les Origines de la Cavalerie française, Paris and Nancy，1905，p.22.
45.Quite similar descriptions and observations are found in the History of the Civil Wars in France（Storia delle guerre civili di Francia），by the Italian Davila, and in the Art of War，“The Difference between Launders and Pistolers，”1590，by the Englishman Roger Williams. They are quoted by C. H. Firth in Cromwell"s Army, p.129.
46.In the Commentaires, Vol.XI, Chaps.11，12，Ed. Lonmier-Guillaume，2：214-222.
47.In his History of the Netherlands War（Geschichte des Niederländischen Krieges），Mendoza reports expressly in his account of the battle on the Mooker Heide that the “horsemen” on the Spanish side had awaited the attack of the enemy squadrons in place—as a result of which, to be sure, they were defeated. It was only a counterattack by another Spanish cavalry unit that threw back the Gueux.
48.Historia, Book 44. Ed.1578，p.560.
2 射手数量的增加与步兵战术的完善
1.Rüstow, Geschichte der Infanterie，1：242 f.，349. Jähns，1：724，726，731. Hobohm，2：472. Pätel, The Organization of the Hessian Army under Philip the Magnanimous（Die Organisation des hessischen Heeres unter Philipp dem Grossmütigen）. Philip gave the marksmen one guilder more per month than the spearmen; nevertheless, they did not reach half the strength.
2.Jähns，1：726.
3.Relazione di Vincenzo Quirini, December 1507（Relazione degli ambassadore Veneti[Eugen Albèri, Series I，6：21]）.
4.Clonard-Brix, p.57.
5.Book XV, Basel，1578，1：315.
6.Truthful Description of the Other Campaign in Austria against the Turks ... in the Past Year 1532. Described in Detail. And now Prepared in Print for the First Time in this Year of 1539. Reprinted in J.U.D. Goebel, Contributions to the National History of Europe under Emperor Charles V（Beiträge zur Staatsgeschichte von Europa unter Kaiser Karl V.），Lemgo，1767，p.326. Further information on the caracole is to be found in Hobohm，2：394，405-407，468，483，508.
7.Rabutin, Commentaires, Ed. Buchon, p.530.
8.Quoted in Rüstow，1：264.
9.Discourse XVIII, Paradoxe 2，p.384.
10.Jovius, Life of Pescara（Le vite ...），Venice，1581，p.213.
11.1 September 1546. Avila, German edition, p.39.
12.There are also reports of mixed combat of marksmen and horsemen（Rüstow，1：314，from Monluc），but these can only have been exceptional cases that had no further development.
13.Jovius in 1535 before Goleta：“duas sclopetariorum manus, quas manicas vocabant, quod cornuum instar ...”（“two bands of sclopetarii, which they call sleeves because they are like wings”）. Book 34，Edition of 1578，p.392. In 1542 before Ofen, the Italian infantry of Alessandro Vitelli “promoto hastatorum agmine et utrinque sclopettariis in cornua expansis Barbaras invadunt”（“After the column of the pikemen had been moved forward and on both sides the sclopetarii had been extended on the wings, they attacked the barbarians”）. Jovius, Histories, Book 42，p.518.
14.As we have already seen on p.94 above, Rüstow called this formation the “Hungarian order，” which he based on the Vienna parade of 1532. But that was only a schematic representation without practical significance. The expression is not derived from the sources any more than is the “Spanish brigade.” Wallhausen speaks not of a “Hungarian order，” but only of a “Hungarian installation，” that is, an administrative arrangement rather than a tactical one. In his Art of Dismounted Warfare（Kriegskunst zu Fuss），Book I, Chap.6，p.110，he says that in Hungary no formation other than the square was used. Jähns，1：711，calls it fatal that there had been acceptance of the procedure advocated by the Italian Tartaglia calling for placing the marksmen in the outer ranks of the square rather than as wings resting on the squares of spearmen, as had already been recommended by Seldeneck in 1480. This criticism seems to me to fail to recognize the principal point. While it is true that the formation of marksmen in wings offered the advantage of better sequence of fire and also a reasonably sure protection, nevertheless, when the attacking horsemen approached, the marksmen always had to find protection either among or inside of the spearmen.
15.As an example of how little we can depend on isolated reports, even when they appear to be well founded, let us note that Jorga, History of the Ottoman Empire（Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches），3：295，tells of a defeat of the Turks in 1593 in which “the janissaries were destroyed by the new cavalry of the West, the heavy horsemen clad in iron on armored horses, and by the harquebusiers.”A Turkish source and a Polish one are cited as a basis. Consequently, the writers had heard of the “new cavalry of the West，” but they had not understood in what respect it was new, and so they describe it as the ancient knights. If we were not informed from other sources, it would be absolutely impossible to recognize what is correct in this exaggerated description. This is a counterpart to the transposition of Winkelried into a knightly battle. A similar situation is to be found in the same work on p.314.
16.1608. Archives of Oranien-Nassau，2d Series，2：389.
17.Institution de la discipline militaire au Royaume de France, Lyons，1559，p.96 ff. The author himself is opposed to the reduced units and believes that, since there are marksmen and horsemen in the intervals, the cannon would find their target in any case. In his opinion, one should seek to prevent the second shot by skirmishing marksmen and horsemen.
18.Rüstow treated these formations very thoroughly in his Geschichte der Infanterie. I do not consider it necessary to go into that in detail, since we find nothing of this kind in the real battles.
19.The extent to which the “terzio” was an administrative or a tactical unit and designation requires further research.
20.Lipsius, de militia Romana（On Roman Military Service），5：20，Opera，1613，2：460. De la Noue, Discourse XVIII，2d Paradoxe. Ed.1587，p.377 ff.
3 奥兰治领主莫里斯
1.On the military library of Maurice of Orange, see Carl Neumann, Rembrandt，1：95.
2.Journal of Anthony Duyck（Journaal van Anthonis Duyck），fiscal advocate of the Council of State（1591-1602）. Published under commission of the War Department, with introduction and notes by Ludwig Mulder, captain of infantry，3 volumes，1862-1866，s"Gravenhage and Arnhem. Duyck"s office was that of a chief of the war chancellery of the Council of State and of the highest juridical official for the army（Mulder, preface, p.LXXXVI）. He was normally present with the army and kept a daily account of events. To judge from an examination of his journal, he was so excellently informed on the thoughts of Maurice as to be possible only through direct verbal contact. In many passages we may consider the journal to be Maurice"s legacy to posterity. Gustav Roloff，“Maurice of Orange and the Founding of the Modern Army”（“Moritz von Oranien und die Begründung des modernen Heeres”），Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol.111，1903.
3.Jähns，1：869 f.
4.Jähns，1：472，705，says that in 1521 Delia Valle recommended the parade march in step; Lodrono did likewise（Jähns，1：724）. See also Hobohm，2：407. In a report on the battle of Ceresole by Bernardo Spina, published by Stallwitz as a supplement to his document on that battle（Berlin dissertation，1911，p.54），it is stated that the Spanish general del Guasto had the recruits drilled immediately before the battle. It is also reported that the French guards had conducted drills.
5.Jähns，1：735.
6.Dilich, Kriegsbuch，1607，p.254，discusses the steps taken to maintain the formation on the march. Among them he says “that in marching, an even and steady step is to be maintained” and “that the drummers maintain a correct beat as if the soldier had to dance by it.”
7.In March 1591 this proportion was 1：0.47. Mulder, preface to Duyck"s Journal，1：51 ff.，1862. He arrives at this number by taking the average of a large number of individual figures in the documents，figures that cannot be confirmed.
8.According to the sketches by John of Nassau, two ranks of musketeers were drawn up forward of the front of the “double-pay men，” that is, the pikemen. Plathner，“Graf Johann von Nassau，”Berlin dissertation，1913，p.57.
9.Dilich, Kriegsbuch，1607，p.290，is not very clear as to what is supposed to happen when a formation of pikemen and marksmen is attacked by mounted men or pikemen. They should either retire behind the pikemen or into the mass of them.
10.Stuttgart Manuscript of 1612. Jähns，2：924. John of Nassau states that Maurice never allowed his system of march and battle formation to be changed, once it had been established, so that merely by drum and trumpet signals each man could take his place. Plathner, p.58.
11.Plathner, p.57.
12.A letter from Sandolin to Lipsius, dated 16 July 1595. Cited in Jähns，2：880. Duke Henri Rohan reported later in his document（cited in Jähns，2：951）that Maurice had found that the armament with shields was better but had not been able to have his opinion accepted, since, of course, he was not the sovereign. See Hobohm，2：452.
13.Mulder, Van Duyck"s Journal，1：636 ff. From 9 August to 26 October 1595. Similarly in 1598. Reyd, Niederländische Geschichte, Vol.XV, Ed.1626，p.569. In the same year the brother of William Louis, John of Nassau, reported from Groningen to their father on drills in the garrisons. Archives of Oranien-Nassau，2d Series，2：403. Wallhausen, Kriegskunst zu Fuss, p.23，reproaches those who say:“What is drilling? When one is fighting for the enemy, one does not drill long.”
14.Chapters IV and VII and a particular paragraph，144，of Chapter XVIII are erroneously identified in the letter as Folio 144. The three echelons are prescribed in it：“Has très acies ad usum separatas, propinquitate conjunctas, ad se mutuo adjuvandas idoneas esse perspeximus”（“We observed that these three battle lines, separated for use and joined by their proximity, are suitable to aid each other mutually”）. The depth of the echelons is given as ten men in Leo. It is interesting to note, incidentally, how understanding and misunderstanding are often confused. In a rather careless way, Leo transferred the tradition concerning the Roman infantry（which eventually goes back to Livy，8.8）to the cavalry. But this attracted so little attention that William Louis, apparently without noticing Leo"s error, was able to transfer it back again to the infantry.
15.A set of instructions for the training of the individual man was Handling of the Guns, Muskets, and Spears（Waffenhandlung von den Rören, Musqueten und Spiessen）by Jacob de Geyn. The Hague，1608. Dedicated to Joachim Ernst, Margrave of Brandenburg. The book is illustrated with large, handsome copper plates. Republished in 1640. The copper plates in Wallhausen"s Kriegskunst zu Fuss are different ones, also quite often different in their arrangement. Geyn distinguishes between marksmen and musketeers; he has forty-two commands for the former and forty-three for the latter. The musketeers have wooden powder containers on bandoliers, while the marksmen do not. For the spearmen there are twenty-one commands, many of them to be carried out in three speeds.
16.Rüstow，1：345，characterizes Maurice"s reforms as having simplified to the maximum the tactical formations. This seems to be the direct opposite of my description, to the extent that I see in the new formations something that had to be worked out and was not at all simple but possible only through hard work. But the difference is apparent rather than real. Rüstow is thinking of those artificial theoretical formations which he thoroughly discusses, like the cross battalion and the eight-cornered unit; they were nothing more than ingenious contrivances and never played a role in actual practice. And in comparison with this, the Netherlandish formation was, of course, a simplification. In comparison with the square of men or the geometric square, which up to that point were the only ones under practical consideration, the Netherlandish method was not a simplification but a far-reaching refinement, and it is only with this explanation that the historical progress is placed in the right light.
17.John of Nassau gives 135 as the normal number, of which 45 have the long spear and 74 are musketeers and marksmen. Plathner, p.40.
18.Everardus Reidanus, Belgarum aliarumque gentium annales（Annals of the Belgians and other Nations），Leyden，1633，8：192. Emmius, Guilelmus Ludovieus（William Louis），1621，p.67. See also Mulder"s preface to Duyck"s Journal，1：16.
19.Krebs, Battle on the White Mountain（Schlacht an dem Weissen Berge），p.25 ff.
20.Reyd, p.281.
21.Billon, p.191.
22.Maurice（19 June 1593），Archives-Oranien-Nassau，2d Series，1：24.
23.Printed in the Works of the Historical Society（Historisch Genootschap）in Utrecht. New series, No.37. Utrecht，1883，p.448 ff.
4 古斯塔夫·阿道夫
1.Fahlbeck, Preussische Jahrbücher，133：535.
2.According to G. Droysen, Gustav Adolf，2：85，the king landed in Pomerania in 1630
with 13，000 men
He already had in Stralsund 6，000
Follow-up forces ca. 7，000
Withdrawn from Prussia 13，600
Total: approximately 40，000
Some 36，000 men remained behind in Sweden, Finland, Prussia, and so forth. Consequently, the entire military strength amounted to 76，000 men，43，000 of whom were levied nationals.
3.Jähns，2：952.
4.In his writings of the year 1673（Schriften，2：672），Montecuccoli actually considers the usual ratio of two-thirds musketeers and one-third pikemen to be wrong. He believes more pikemen are needed to cover the musketeers in battle, for the latter, alone, would be overpowered by the cavalry. He points out that this was what happened at Lens, for example, where Condé defeated the Lotharingians. At Breitenfeld, hesays, the Holstein regiment held fast because of its pikemen until it was overcome by the artillery. He reports the same thing in 2：223. He claims that the ratio of two-thirds to one-third was acceptable only because on so many occasions outside of battle the musketeers were more useful than the pikemen.
5.“The Swedish Discipline，” cited in Firth, Cromwell"s Army, p. 105.
6.According to Firth, p.104.
7.Firth, Cromwell"s Army, p.98，from the Swedish Intelligencer，1：124.
8.On the leather cannon, see Gohlke in the Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde，4：392，and Feldhaus, p.121.“Leather pieces” are also mentioned in the introductory poem to the Little War Book（Kriegsbüchlein）of Lavater of Zurich，1644. He says they did not come first from Sweden to Zurich，“but rather from us to them.”
9.Letter to Aldringer，2 January 1633，reproduced in Förster, Wallenstein"s Letters（Wallensteins Briefe）. Daniel"s statement in History of the Military（Geschichte des Kriegswesens），5：12，that Henry IV of France had already required that his squadrons fire a single salvo with their pistols and then attack with cold steel, must be based on a misunderstanding. I have found nothing on this in the sources, and the objective prerequisite for such action is missing, that is, a stricter discipline. Davila states expressly that at Ivry, the last large battle of Henry IV, his squadrons used the caracole.
10.This explanation has been preserved for us in the work of an English military author, Turner, and it goes back to English officers who had served under Gustavus Adolphus. I draw the quotation from Firth, Cromwell"s Army, p.289. The passages cited in Mareks, Coligny, p.56，and Hobohm, Machiavelli，2：373，385，which seem to prove an earlier occurrence of the running of the spear gauntlet—especially Bouchet, Preuves de l"histoire de l"illustre maison de Coligny（Evidence on the History of the Illustrious House of Coligny），1642，p.457—are based on erroneous translations.“Passer par les piques”（“to pass before the pikes”）is the “law of the long spears，” mentioned on p.61 above. Of course, La Curne de St. Palaye, Dictionnaire de l"ancien langage français, Vol.8，understands this expression as meaning striking with the spear shafts. I consider that impossible; the spears are too long to be used that way.
11.Cited in Firth, Cromwell"s Army, p.321.
5 克伦威尔
1.The outstanding book by C.H. Firth, Cromwell"s Army, London，1902，covers exhaustively the subject of Cromwell as a military organizer, the role in which he is of most interest to us. The extensive work by Fritz Hoenig, Oliver Cromwell, Berlin，1887，is not up to par. See the review in the Historische Zeitschrift，63：482，and the Historical Review, Vol.15（1889），19，p.599. It was only in his later writings that Hoenig brought his considerable talent to its full development.
2.According to Hoenig, II，2，269，this command originated in 1643.
3.According to an estimate by W.G. Ross, reported in the Historische Zeitschrift，63（1889）：484，the parliamentary army numbered 13，500 men, including 7，000 infantry, whereas the royal army had only 8，000 men, half infantry and half cavalry. See Firth, p.111.
4.Hoenig attributed to Cromwell specific creations in the tactical employment of cavalry, the formation of echelons, and so on, and saw in him the predecessor of Frederick and Seydlitz and even the guiding spirit for our time. I cannot agree with him on this. The entire organization of military units of the seventeenth century with the matter of effectiveness of their weapons is too different from the conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to justify such comparisons. Hoenig is also in error（I，2，247）when he attributes to Cromwell the formation of divisions in the Napoleonic sense.
5.Firth, p.101.
6.See my article “Anglicanism and Presbyterianism” in the Historisch-Politische Aufsätze.
6 战例介绍
1.H.von Koss，“The Battles of St. Quentin and Gravelingen”（“Die Schlachten bei St. Quentin und Gravelingen”），Berlin dissertation，1914，E. Ebering Press. I am not so sure whether the analysis of Gravelingen in this otherwise very worthwhile work is appropriate. The points raised by Elkan against this work in his review in the Historische Zeitschrift，116：533，apply only to secondary items, partly simple typographical errors. The question, too, of the intervention of the English ships, which Koss, with good reasons, doubts, is not significant from the military history viewpoint, but, on the basis of testimony cited by Elkan and overlooked by Koss, this point calls for further study.
2.Swiss battle reports in Segesser, Ludwig Pfyffer and His Times（Ludwig Pfyffer und seine Zeit），1：621.
3.Special study on the battle by Gigon, La troisième guerre de religion，1912. Gigon gives the Huguenots a strength of 12，000 infantry and 7，000 cavalry and the Catholics 15，000 infantry and 8，000 cavalry. Other writers assume considerably higher numbers for the Catholics. According to Popelinière, Coligny supposedly used the method of blending the infantry and the cavalry（“d"enlacer l"infanterie et la cavallerie”）in small units. The account of the battle, however, does not show that.
4.The standard monograph is by J. Krebs, Berlin，1879. Brendel，1875，gives nothing useful from a military standpoint. A few details are to be found in Riezler, Sitzungsberichte der Münchener Akademie, Phil. Abt.，Vol.23，1906.
5.Riezler, p.84，of course assumes that the army of the League was only 10，000 men strong and had lose 12，000 to 15，000 men from sickness in the preceding campaign. The “Hungarian fever” was raging at that time in all camps.
6.According to Anhalt, the formation of the Bohemians was 3，750 paces wide at most, and it appears as if the animal park was not included in that figure. According to the illustration in Krebs, however, the width was not even 2，000 meters, including the position in the animal park, and, remarkably enough, this was estimated on the same scale as equal to 5，000 feet. On page 171 Krebs assumes that the front was about 3，600 meters. In any case, the front was very long for the small army.
7.Later, Tilly reproached his colleague Buquoi for having divided up his horsemen into “little squadrons”（“squadronelli”）.
8.In his report Christian speaks only of Thurn"s musketeers, as if there were no pikemen there at all.
9.According to Gindely，2：119，the units（Fähnlein）of the Bohemian regiments were composed of 24 privates first class，76 pikemen, and 200 musketeers.
10.The standard special study on the battle is by Walter Opitz（Leipzig, A. Deichert，1892）. The dissertation by Wangerin, Halle，1896，is only a study of the sources without significant conclusions.
11.Opitz, p.76，established the fact that Tilly wanted to move from Leipzig to the Elbe, in order to gain a crossing and to draw Field Marshal Tiefenbach to him from Silesia. Once he had this latter force, Pappenheim was to be detached to Mecklenburg in the rear of the Swedish king. That was the plan in case the enemy again avoided battle. For the battle itself the plan was only significant to the extent that it may have contributed to the fact that they did not want to go back behind the Elster to await Aldringer.
12.Jähns, History of Military Sciences（Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften），1：572.
13.Following Rüstow"s sample, Opitz has Tilly"s infantry arranged in the form of a Spanish brigade. It may be that they were formed this way for a moment. It is not reported, and, of course, it does not matter tactically, since in their movement forward it would have been neither possible nor advantageous to hold the four units together in some kind of prescribed figure. It is expressly stated in a French report and in Chemnitz（Opitz, p.92）that Tilly"s entire army stood in a single echelon, and Montecuccoli, Writings，2：581，says that Tilly was defeated at Leipzig mainly because he had drawn up his entire army in a single, right-angled front without reserves. The discrepancy that, according to Field Marshal Horn"s report, Tilly"s infantry was aligned in four battalions, whereas the French report states fourteen battalions（Opitz, p.93），can probably be explained by the fact that in the latter figure the cavalry formations are also counted as battalions. Furthermore, as in the infantry, several regiments of cavalry may have been assembled in a single tactical unit.
14.In his sketch, Opitz obviously shows the Swedes as much too wide, the Saxons as too narrow. Since it is reported of both formations that they were a good 21/2 miles wide（extract from Schreiber"s report of 8 September. Droysen, Archives for Saxon History [Archiv für sächsische Geschichte]，7：348）and the right flank of the Swedes extended beyond the enemy flank, then the imperial right flank must no doubt have extended beyond the enemy flank, the Saxons.
15.Montecuccoli, Works，2：579，states that the principal reason for the Swedish victory was that they placed the musketeers between the cavalry. The cavalry had to be so formed that the enemy first had to pass through the musket fire, and in the weakened condition into which that brought him, he was then attacked by the cavalry.
16.This action by the artillery is not mentioned in the actual battle reports, but it does appear in Chemnitz and Montecuccoli. This is consistent with the fact that Tilly, in his various reports（Droysen, Archives for Saxon History，7：391-392），strongly emphasized the enemy"s superiority in artillery.
17.Karl Deuticke，“The Battle of Lützen”（“Die Schlacht bei Lützen”），Giessen dissertation，1917. It was not until the appearance of this excellent study, in which the scattered sources, especially letters, were collected and studied with the greatest care with the help of the Stockholm Library, that a correct and reliable picture of the details of this battle was achieved.
18.It is not definitely reported as to whether Wallenstein had additional light pieces along with his twenty-one heavy cannon. We only know from several letters in the Fontes rerum austriacarum（Sources of Austrian History），Vol.65，that he had procured such cannon.
19.Deuticke, p.67.
20.Unfortunately, we do not have information on the strength of this corps; it can hardly have been more than 6，000 men. On the day of the battle it was still at Torgau and would therefore not have been able to reach the vicinity of Lützen for several days. Gustavus Adolphus had ordered it to follow the route via Riesa and Oschatz in order to avoid Eilenburg and Leipzig, which were occupied by the emperor"s forces.
21.The more recent monographs on this battle, on which my account is based, are principally those of Walter Struck, Stralsund，1893，and Erich Leo, Halle，1900. But neither of them distinguishes sufficiently between a positive decision to seek the battle and the mere risk of bringing on the battle as the result of a maneuver. Nor has the lively description of the battle by Colonel Kaiser in the Literarische Beilage des Staatsanzeigers für Württemberg，1897，come to grips with this decisive point. It was only later that I became acquainted with “From Lützen to Nördlingen”（“Von Lützen nach Nördlingen”）by Karl Jacob（1904），who seeks to prove that Bernhard von Weimar was unjustly exalted and Swedish Field Marshal Horn was a much better strategist. What Jacob says in Horn"s favor may well be essentially correct, but his pejorative judgment of Bernhard shows prejudice and insufficient training in military history. In the points of controversy between Leo and Struck, Jacob correctly sides strongly with Struck.
22.Jacob criticizes Bernhard for attacking at all. He believes that wing should have maintained a purely defensive stance in order to cover a possible withdrawal with its full strength still available. Such conduct would have been poor testimony for the military genius of Bernhard. Of course, since the battle was lost, the defeat was all the more frightful in that Bernhard had insufficient reserves to send in to cover the withdrawal. Nevertheless, if he had remained passive in the battle for this eventuality, a victory would have been impossible, since the enemy could then have had all the more troops to employ against Horn. From all appearances, Bernhard understood his mission absolutely correctly—to keep the enemy on his flank as occupied as possible but without bringing on the decisive battle there.
23.Leo, p.59，estimates the strength of the Catholic army between 40，000 and 50，000 men, a small portion of which remained in position facing Nördlingen, while he considers the strength of the Swedes between 19，000 and 22，000 regulars and 5，000 to 6，000 Württemberg militia. M. Ritter, History of the Thirty Years"War（Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges），p.580，agrees with these estimates, as does Jacob, p.109. Unfortunately, we learn nothing specific about the employment and conduct of this militia in the battle. It must have been in position on Bernhard"s flank and therefore probably remained unengaged in the actual battle but was overtaken by the enemy on the withdrawal and cut down. Even in Kaiser"s account, where we would most likely expect it, there is nothing further of any significance.
24.Leo, p.66，note, cites several sources to the effect that Bernhard from the very start—that is, as early as in the council of war that decided on the march onto the Arnsberg—wished to bring on the decisive battle and so recommended. But Leo"s sources are not completely reliable, and it could, for example, easily be the case that remarks by the prince on the evening of the march or the morning of the battle, when it was a question of whether or not they should seek to take the Allbuch position by force, were transposed back to the council of war.
25.The authoritative monograph is Rudolf Schmidt"s “The Battle of Wittstock”（“Die Schlacht bei Wittstock”），Halle，1876.
26.Letter to Field Marshal Count Götz, who was in command in Hesse, dated 9 October, and therefore five days after the battle. Quoted in von dem Decken, Duke George of Braunschweig and Lüneburg（Herzog Georg von Braunschweig und Lüneburg），3：277.
第三篇 常备军时代
1 总论
1.On the origin and development of the Austrian army see History of the Imperial and Royal Armed Forces from 1618 to the End of the Nineteenth Century（Geschichte der kaiserlichen und königlichen Wehrmacht von 1618 bis Ende des XIX. Jahrhunderts），published by the Directorate of the Imperial and Royal Military Archives.
2 法国
1.French History（Französische Geschichte），1：369.
2.Susane, Histoire de la cavallerie française，1：82.
3.Campaigns of Prince Eugene（Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen），1：507.
4.Susane, Histoire de l"infanterie，1：78.
5.The Spanish terzios, which were created in 1544，may have served as a model; their relationship to the columellas is not clear.
6.Mention, L"armée de l"ancien régime.1900.
7.Ritter, German History in the Period of the Counterreformation（Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation），3：518.
8.André，Le Tellier, p.26.
9.André，p.217.
10.According to Susane, Ed.of 1876，p.312，at the beginning of 1791 the rank and file of the infantry did not number more than 125，000 men.
11.Susane, Histoire de la cavallerie française, pp.136，154.
12.Louis André，Michel Le Tellier et l"organisation de l"armée monarchique, Paris, Felix Alcan，1906. This is a large work, supported by many documents. At times the tendency to emphasize Le Tellier"s accomplishments is somewhat too strong. In 1900 the French War Ministry published a work entitled Historiques des Corps de Troupe de l"armée française（1569-1900）. The introduction gives a summary of the important references since the work by Daniel in 1721. The book contains a tabular presentation of all troop units since 1589 without any further source studies, as well as the names of the commanders, of the battles in which the units participated, and so forth.
13.Susane, p.100. De la Noue concludes that the Spanish infantry was better than the French from the fact that so many noblemen were in the Spanish service（Jähns, p.564）. A remarkable account of weekly changes of the Spanish commanders, determined by lot, is reported for the year 1538 by Jovius, Book 37，Ed.1578，pp.364，366.
14.Discours XIV, Ed.1587，p.338.
15.The first trace of a distinction in principle between officers and noncommissioned officers I find in a remark by de la Noue in Discours XIII, Ed.1587，p.322. In that passage he praises the Spanish for obeying the orders of even simple sergeants, and their officers all the more.
16.I.G. Hoyer, History of the Art of War（Geschichte der Kriegskunst），p.188，who was still familiar with the living tradition, considers that the principal reason for the poor discipline of the French in the eighteenth century was the selling of officer positions. But we may not observe such points in isolation and then consider them as basic causes. In the English army, too, the sale of positions was common, and it not only maintained its discipline, but this deformity even offered the advantage that an outstanding man, if he was also rich, could attain a higher command position at a very young age. Thus Wellington became a lieutenant colonel at age twenty-three.
17.The relationship of the noble and bourgeois officers in the French army is treated very thoroughly in the book by Louis Tuetey, The Officers under the Ancien Régime, Nobles and Commoners（Les officiers sous l"ancien régime, nobles et roturiers），Paris，1908.
18.Puységur, Chap.VI, p.50，estimates sixteen to seventeen men for each officer, but on p.103，some twenty-five men per officer. Sicard, Histoire des institutions militaires des Français，2：229，estimates twelve to thirteen men per officer（79，050：6553），and on p.244，nineteen to twenty men（686：35 in the infantry battalion）. Susane, Histoire de l"infanterie française，1：278，has fifteen men per officer（685：35）. Berenhorst, Observations（Betrachtungen），1：61，estimates eighteen men for one officer（900：50）. Susane adds to his numbers the statement that in 1718 the number was found to be much too large and consequently the number of companies was reduced, but in 1734 they were again increased. Hoyer, Geschichte der Kriegskunst，2：505，states that, as a result of the reforms of the minister of war, St. Germain, the strength of the companies was fixed at 125 souls, including seven or eight officers. Chuquet says the number of French officers in 1789 was about 9，000. In Austria, too, the number of officers at the time of Prince Eugene was very large. Montecuccoli required thirty-three officers for 1，500 men. In December 1740 Prussia had 3，116 officers for about 100，000 men, and in 17865，300 officers for some 200，000 men. The Thüna regiment in 1784 numbered fifty-two officers and 2，186 noncommissioned officers and men, including forty reserves, consequently one officer for forty-two men.Militär-Wochenblatt，1909，col.3768.
19.The statements in the biographies by Sarrans-Jeune and Kläber, concerning Bernadotte"s entrance into service, do not agree completely.
20.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，77：523.
21.Hoyer, Geschichte der Kriegskunst，2：199. According to Nys, International Law（Le droit international），3：512，the first treaty on ransoms was made in 1550 between Maurice of Saxony and Magdeburg. The ransom was not to exceed one month"s pay. Heffter-Geffcken, International Law（Völkerrecht），section 142，names as the oldest agreement concerning the exchange of prisoners and ransoms a treaty between France and Holland in 1673. Pradier-Fodéré，Traité de droit international public，7：45，refers to still other treaties. At times the maximum limit for a ransom was fixed at the pay for a quarter of the year.
22.The first promise to care for the sick and wounded that I can remember having read is contained in a pay contract of Stralsund of 1510（Beck, Artikelsbriefe, p.118），where care of the wounded and of disabled veterans is promised.
23.Daniels，“Ferdinand von Braunschweig，”Preussische Jahrbücher，80：509. See also 79：287.
3 勃兰登堡-普鲁士
1.The Netherlander Le Hon（Hondius）wrote concerning Wallhausen（Jähns，2：1039）：
Wallhausen has made a large book of the drills of a regiment which do not occur among us and were also not used by the Prince of Orange ... which are nothing more than fantasies that one puts on paper and which cannot be applied by any officer or soldier, indeed not by the author himself, who, like Icarus, wants to fly so high that he must fall down from above, who thinks that by putting figures on paper they must be heard by many people.
The Frenchman Bardin called Wallhausen"s Kriegskunst zu Fuss “an illegible confused mixture, from which there is nothing to be learned”（Jähns，2：1042）.
2.In his defense let it be noted that even a soldier like Montecuccoli wrote something similar：“If one wishes to form a unit of lancers, not for the attack but for defense, one can give it a square formation, facing toward all four sides.”Round or spherical formations were also recommended. Writings（Schriften），1：352.
3.L. Plathner，“Count John of Nassau and the First Military School”（“Graf Johann von Nassau und die erste Kriegsschule”），Berlin dissertation，1913.
4.Around 1559 Count Reinhart Solms wrote a military encyclopedia, which Jähns，1：510，calls “Military Government”（“Kriegsregierung”），in which he emphatically rejects the idea of the militia, since the men would run away when the situation became serious. Lazarus Schwendi was in favor of the militia（Jähns, p.539）. General von Klitzing drew up a report for Duke Georg of Braunschweig-Lüneburg in which he stated that, according to his experience, militiamen could not stand up to recruited troops. He recommended mixing recruited soldiers and those who were levied. Von dem Decken, Duke George of Braunschweig-Lüneburg（Herzog Georg von Braunschweig-Lüneburg），2：189.
5.The militia was only used with success once in a secondary role; when the duke moved into Bohemia in 1620，he used the militia to protect his country against the Union. Krebs, Battle on the White Mountain（Schlacht am weissen Berge），p.32.
6.When the burgomaster of Augsburg in 1544 forced all the citizens to procure weapons and participate in daily drills, the entire city rose up against this procedure and said it was nonsense, an unnecessary waste of time and money, since, in view of the importance of Augsburg"s industries, this purpose could better and more cheaply be accomplished with paid mercenaries. Schmoller, Tübinger Zeitschrift，16：486.
7.Jany, The Beginnings of the Old Army（Die Anfänge der alten Armee），p.2.
8.Jany，1：10. Krollmann, The Defense Work in the Kingdom of Prussia（Das Defensionswerk im Königreich Preussen），1909.
9.Meynert, History of the Military and of Army Organizations in Europe（Geschichte des Kriegswesens und der Heerverfassungen in Europa），2：99.
10.In June 1625 the total cost of deliveries in Hesse taken by the billeted troops of the League since 1623 only in the cities and the villages subject to the princes（and not the villages of the nobility），without counting robberies and destruction, was estimated as 3，318，000 imperial talers. This was much more than ten times the amount approved by the Estates three years earlier for the landgrave, but with which the country had not been able to be defended. M. Ritter, German History（Deutsche Geschichte），3：260. Gindely estimates the total contributions raised by Wallenstein in his first period of command as between 200 and 210 million talers. The city of Halle alone showed that from December 1625 to September 1627 it had paid 430，274 guilders.
11.Droysen, Prussian Politics（Preussische Politik），3：1，49.
12.von Bonin，“The War Council of the Electorate of Brandenburg，1630-41”（“Der kurbrandenburgische Kriegsrat，1630-1641”），Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，1913，p.51 ff.
13.Researchers are not yet completely in agreement on the content and the nature of the reduction of 1641 and of the strength until 1656. J.G. Droysen"s concept that it was principally a question in 1641 of a relief from the double obligation to the emperor and the prince elector and that the young ruler simultaneously broke the opposition of the colonels and the Estates in order to create the unified army thenceforth obligated only to the prince has now been generally dropped. Meinardus，“Minutes and Accounts of the Brandenburg Privy Council”（“Protokolle und Relationen des Brandenburgischen Geheimen Rats”），introduction to the first and second volumes. Article，“Schwarzenberg” in the Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie. Article in the Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol.86，by Schrötter，“The Brandenburg-Prussian Army Organization Under the Great Elector”（“Die brandenburgisch-preussische Heeresverfassung unter dem Grossen Kurfürsten”），1892. Brake，“The Reduction of the Brandenburg-Prussian Army in the Summer of 1641”（“Die Reduktion des brandenburgisch-preussischen Heeres im Sommer 1641”），Bonn dissertation，1898. In this connection see also Meinardus, Historische Zeitschrift，81：556，82：370. Jany，“Die Anfänge der alten Armee.”Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte des preussischen Heeres（Documentary Contributions to the History of the Prussian Army），Vol.1，1901.
14.Ferdinand Hirsch，“The Army of the Great Elector”（“Die Armee des Grossen Kurfürsten”），Historische Zeitschrift，53（1885）：231.
15.This important observation is made by B.von Bonin in the Archives for Military Law（Archiv für Militärrecht），1911，p.262.
16.See the article “The Prussian District President”（“Der preussische Landrat”）in my Historical and Political Essays（Historische und politische Aufsätze），where the difference between the Prussian, English, and French administrative systems is discussed.
17.Ritter，“Wallenstein"s System of Contributions”（“Das Kontributionssystem Wallensteins”），Historische Zeitschrift，90：193. In Wallenstein"s army administration, which attempted to assure that, despite all their contributions, the burghers and peasants could tolerate them quite well, Ranke has already recognized the “trait of the national prince” in the great condottiere.
18.von Schrötter，“The Bringing of the Prussian Army to Strength Under the First King”（“Die Ergänzung des preussischen Heeres unter dem ersten Könige”），Brandenburgisch-preussische Forschungen，1910，p.413.
19.Schrötter, Brandenburgisch-preussische Forschungen，23：463.
20.As an analogy to the way the old “Land Defense” was carried over into the standing army, let us note a negotiation between the emperor and the Lower Austrian Estates in 1639. The Estates wanted to establish the principle that the land defense could only be used within the territorial borders. The emperor demanded that every twentieth man be provided and proposed for consideration “whether these men could better be used by assigning them to a special corps or whether they should be incorporated as fillers in the old regiments.”According to Meynert, Geschichte des Kriegswesens，3：10.
21.The standard study is Max Lehmann"s “Recruitment, Service Obligation, and System of Leaves in the Army of Frederick William I”（“Werbung, Wehrpflicht und Beurlaubung im Heere Friedrich Wilhelms I.”），Historische Zeitschrift, Vol.67，1891. A very clear insight of the structure of the Prussian army in the eighteenth century, based word for word on the sources, is given in the work of Erwin Dette, Frederick the Great and His Army（Friedrich der Grosse und sein Heer），Göttingen, Vanderhoeck und Ruprecht，1915. I have taken several characteristic observations verbatim from this excellent work.
22.It is all the more remarkable when, according to Schrötter, p.466，at the death of Frederick I there already existed a levy system along controlled lines, with exemption of those with special possessions, that was quite similar to the situation created by the “canton regulation.”It appears that the purely arbitrary aspect of the levying by the officers was completely consonant with the forceful character of Frederick William I.
23.Courbière, History of the Brandenburg-Prussian Military Organization（Geschichte der Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Heeresverfassung），p.119. When reference is made on p.120 to men of 3 inches and under 3 inches, this seems to me to stem from a writing error. As the smallest height, which was waived only under conditions of a complete scarcity of manpower, as in the last year of the Seven Years"War, we can regard 5 feet，5 inches（1.70 meters）. See Grünhagen, Silesia under Frederick the Great（Schlesien unter Friedrich dem Grossen），1：405. Reimann, History of the Prussian Nation（Geschichte des preussischen Staates），1：154，claims that even in garrison regiments men could not be less than 5 feet，3 inches tall. According to Koser, Friedrich der Grosse，1：538，Frederick required in the older regiments men of 5 feet，8 inches in the front rank and 5 feet，6 inches in the second rank. For the newer regiments, these requirements were 5 feet，7 inches and 5 feet，5 inches, respectively.
24.A report of the government of the electoral march of 1811 states：“In earlier times, as filler replacements, only such a moderate number of natives was required that only those subjects who were completely dispensable were enlisted, and that was determined by the civil authorities.”
25.Studies in Brandenburg-Prussian History（Forschungen zur Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Geschichte），7：308.
26.Ranke, Werke，27：230.
27.Jähns，2：914.
28.Excerpted from Tactical Training（Taktische Schulung），p.687.
29.von Osten-Sacken, Prussia"s Army from Its Beginnings to the Present（Preussens Heer von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart），1911，1：173.
30.These numbers are estimated for the regiment that was named “Thüna” in 1784 and “Winnig” in 1806. Ollech，“Life of Reiher”（“Leben Reihers”），Militär-Wochenblatt，1859，p.11. Kunhardt von Schmidt, Militär-Wochenblatt，1909，col.3771. The latter correctly assumes that, in view of the uniformity throughout the army, these lists give a picture not only of the individual troop unit but of the entire infantry of the period. Similar age relationships already existed in 1704. Schrötter, p.453.
31.M. Lehmann, p.278.
32.Basta（Book I, Chap.6—consequently, long before the Thirty Years"War）was already complaining about the start of the practice of filling the captains"positions only with aristocrats, even when they were completely inexperienced, so that no private soldier any longer had the hope of moving up, except in very exceptional cases. According to Löwe, Organization of Wallenstein"s Army（Organisation des Wallensteinschen Heeres），p.86，most of the colonels and generals in the Thirty Years"War were nobles, but among the lower officers there were still quite a number of former privates. G. Droysen，“Contributions to the History of the Military System During the Period of the Thirty Years"War”（“Beiträge zur Geschichte des Militärwesens während der Epoche des 30jährigen Krieges”），Zeitschrift für Kulturgeschichte, Vol.4，1875，emphasizes strongly, in opposition to Gansauge, that there was not yet any officer corps at that time.
33.Schrötter, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen, Vol.27.
34.Treated very clearly by Richard M. Meyer，“The Military Titles”（“Die militärischen Titel”）in the Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung, Vol.12，Book 3（1910），p.145.
The 1726 regulation of Frederick William I shows a great similarity to a Spanish regulation. Jähns，2：1577，believes that it goes back directly to the Spanish. Erben, in the Mitteilungen des kaiserlichen und königlichen Heeresmuseums，1（1902）：3，seems to refute that. I hesitate to make any definitive judgment.
35.Schmoller in the Historische Zeitschrift，30：61.
36.Observations on the Art of War（Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst），section 13.
37.G.Droysen，“Beiträge，”Zeitschrift für deutsche Kulturgeschichte, new series，4（1875）：592.
38.“Report of the Ambassador Valory of 1748.”Ed. Koser, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，7（1894）：299. Valory stresses the marching in step of the Prussians so strongly that we may doubt whether the French had it.
39.Daniels，“Ferdinand von Braunschweig，”Preussische Jahrbücher, Vols.77，78，79，80，82.
40.According to Frederick"s so-called Military Testament, there are supposed to have been 110，000 natives and 80，000 foreigners in 1780，but the numbers are not entirely certain, since natives who were not from the regimental canton were also counted as foreigners.
41.The Militia Gallica by Wallhausen（French Military Service; translation of a book by Montgommery），p.44，precisely states how broad was the power of punishment of each position. The colonel was allowed to strike and kill with the sword, even officers. The sergeant-major had similar authority, but he could also strike with the staff, that is, with his measuring stick. Nobody was to feel insulted by this. The captain was allowed to strike with the flat of his sword. The lieutenants and sergeants could do likewise on the march or in the trenches, but in garrison only against their direct subordinates. The ensign was allowed to do this only when substituting for the lieutenant or captain. The sergeant（in contradiction to the foregoing！）could strike only on the march, in battle, on guard duty, and in the trenches, with the shaft of the halberd, and not with the sword, if a soldier left his post, but not in garrison or for other reasons.
42.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，82：270.
43.According to the estimates of the General Staff Work. That was, therefore, at the moment Frederick started the war. Ranke，3：148 cites a memorandum, according to which Frederick William I, on his death, had left behind 83，484 men, including 72，000 men in the field army; other statements show up to 89，000 men. According to Schrötter, the Prussian army on 2 January 1705，when it had been strongly reinforced with the assistance of the subsidies of the sea powers, already amounted to 47，031，and with the militia 67，000 men, that is, almost 4 percent of the population.
44.Preussische Jahrbücher，142：300.
4 操练与18世纪的战术变化
1.Rüstow, Geschichte der Infanterie，2：42 ff.
2.Jany, p.108.
3.Pastenacci, Battle of Enzheim（Schlacht bei Enzheim）.
4.In the battles of Klissow（1702）and Fraustadt（1706），the Saxon infantry tried unsuccessfully to protect itself against the Swedes with chevaux-de-frise.
5.According to Würdinger, Military History of Bavaria（Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern），2：349，such an “awl spear” appears in a Passau armory register of 1488.
6.According to sources cited by Firth in Cromwell"s Army, p.87，a light musket with a flintlock was already in widespread use as a hunting weapon by the German peasants at the start of the seventeenth century. In 1626 with these muskets the peasants completely wiped out imperial regiments that Christian of Braunschweig had defeated.
7.At this point I wish to assemble a number of data concerning the technical improvements of the firearm, without claiming accuracy for each individual date. From this listing, however, we gain an overall view as to how gradually such a development occurs, step by step.
Of significance in the references is the work by Thierbach in the Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde, Vol.II，“On the Development of the Bayonet”（“Ueber die Entwicklung des Bajonetts”）and also Vol.III.
Second half of the sixteenth century: paper cartridges for horsemen. 1608：loading in 95 tempo.1653：paper cartridges initially without the ball. Spak, in the Festschrift für Thierbach, claims to prove that muskets without forks were given to the regiments for the first time in 1655.1670：introduction of cartridges in the Brandenburg infantry.1684：flintlock muskets introduced in Austria.1688：the bayonet reportedly invented by Vauban.1690：introduction of paper cartridges in France（Jähns，2：1236）.1698：Leopold von Dessau adopts the iron ramrod in his regiment.1699：bayonet with cross-arm.1703：final abandonment of the pikes by the French.1708：abandonment of the pikes by the Netherlanders, according to Coxe, Life of Marlborough（Leben Marlboroughs），4：303.1718：the iron ramrod adopted in the whole Prussian army from this year on.1721：abandonment of pikes by the Russians.1733：loading with bayonets fixed in Prussia（Jähns，3：2498）.1744（or possibly 1742）：the iron ramrod in Austria.1745：the iron ramrod in France. The Well Drilled Prussian Soldier（Der wohl exerzierte Preussische Soldat），by Johann Conrad Müller，“Free Ensign and Citizen of the Town of Schaffhausen，”1759，states on p.18 that shortly before the current campaign Frederick had had new stocks placed on all the muskets and had the foremost ring for the ramrod made in funnel form so that the rod could be brought more securely into place. The author also states that the grips described by him could not be done with the wooden ramrod.1773: replacement of the conical ramrod in Prussia by the cylindrical rod.
Thierbach states that in tests which Napoleon had made in 1811，every seventh shot was a misfire; according to Schmidt, Hand Firearms（Handfeuerwaffe），p.38，of every 100 shots，20 were misfires and 10 were ignition failures. In tests that were conducted by the French government in 1829 with the same flintlock musket, there was only one misfire for every fifteen shots.
8.The standard study is the article “The Tactical Training of the Prussian Army by King Frederick the Great during the Period of Peace from 1745 to 1756”（“Die taktische Schulung der preussischen Armee durch König Friedrich den Grossen während der Friedenszeit 1745 bis 1756”）in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, published by the Great General Staff, Vol.28/30，1900.
9.Taktische Schulung, p.663.
10.Jähns, p.2105.
11.Berenhorst, Observations on the Art of War, Its Progress, Its Contradictions, and Its Reliability（Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst，über ihre Fortschritte, ihre Widersprüche und ihre Zuverlässigkeit），1797，pp.239-240.
12.Taktische Schulung, p.665.
13.The prince of Ligne reports that on a single occasion in his many campaigns, in the engagement at Mons（1757），he heard bayonets striking against one another. Berenhorst states that in military history there is not a single properly confirmed example that the rifles of opposing sides had crossed one another and there had been hand-to-hand fighting. Emperor William I also paid no attention to the use of the bayonet in the training of soldiers, since he believed it had no practical value.
14.Scharnhorst，3：273，states that many tests had shown that the firing against a line of cavalry resulted in 403 hits of 1，000 shots at 100 paces，149 hits at 300 paces, and 65 hits at 400 paces. In the case of a platoon well drilled in aiming, there were considerably more hits at the greater distances, up to twice as many. At 400 paces “the effect was hardly to be taken into consideration.”Against infantry, of course, the effect was considerably smaller. For more on this subject, see Taktische Schulung, p.431. In Firth, Cromwell"s Army, p.89，the range of the muskets of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is given as 600 paces, according to the evidence of several confirming sources, and it is not impossible that this range was greater than that of the musket of the eighteenth century.
15.Austria. Regulations of 1759（Regulament von 1759）. Jähns, p.2035.
16.In agreement with Taktische Schulung, p.446.
17.General Staff, Military History Monographs（Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften），27：380.
18.“Dispositions for the Battle of Zorndorf”（“Disposition für Schlacht bei Zorndorf”），Militärischer Nachlass des Grafen Henckel，2：79.“On the wing that is supposed to attack, there will be three echelons. If a battalion in the first echelon is broken up or repulsed, the battalion of the second echelon standing directly behind it is to move immediately into the first echelon, and one from the third echelon must replace it in the second echelon so that the battalion that is broken up and repulsed must form again in good order and advance with the others.”
19.Montecuccoli, Schriften，2：350. The Austrian Military Field Regulations of 1759 state 500 paces（Jähns，3：2035）. The Regulations for the Royal Prussian Infantry（Reglement vor die Königliche Preussische Infanterie）of 1726 in Title XX, Article 1，“... that one cannot shoot that far with any musket ball.”
20.The General Staff Work and the two monographs 27 and 28/30 added very valuable new material on this subject, but in the end they stray into a description of the oblique battle order that is much too narrow. It has been rejected by Lieutenant Colonel Schnackenburg in the Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine, Vol.116，Book 2，1900. The basis for the correct concept had already been found by Otto Herrmann in the Brandenburg-Prussian Studies（Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen），5（1892）：459，and the entire problem was solved once and for all in the exemplary study of Rudolf Keibel, outstanding in its source critique, completeness, and reasoning, which appeared in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，14（1901）：95. A final effort by Jany to defend the concept of the General Staff in the Hohenzollern-Jahrbuch，1911，has been refuted by O. Herrmann in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，27（1914）：555.
21.Montecuccoli，2：581，also calls Nieuport, Breitenfeld, and Alterheim wing battles. Breitenfeld did indeed become a wing battle, although it was not planned that way.
22.Jähns，1：520，522.
23.The details are to be found in Herrmann, p.464.
24.Clausewitz（“Seven Years"War”），Work，10：56，writes：“According to the prejudices and the arrangements of that period，40，000 or 50，000 men could not fight in any other way than by forming in advance in a cohesive battle formation.”The reproach which is felt in the word “prejudices” seems unjustified; it was a result dictated by the nature of things. Because the lines were so extremely thin, they had to be unbroken. Every interval would have offered an extremely dangerous point for a penetration.
25.According to Jähns，2：1521.
26.Frederick himself, in his General-Prinzipien（Article XXII, No.7），describes “my oblique order of battle” in this manner：
One refuses the enemy one wing and reinforces the one that is to attack; with the latter you direct all your efforts against a wing of the enemy that you take in the flank; an army of 100，000 men, if taken in the flank, can be beaten by 30，000 men, for the affair is then quickly decided.
27.Even the continuous line of the infantry was by no means maintained rigidly by the king; rather, he freed himself in keeping with the circumstances. This point is proven by O.Herrmann for the battles of Prague and Kollin, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，26：499 and note on p.513.
28.It was their observation and follow-up of this work in all its details that led the General Staff astray in placing the beginning of the oblique battle formation in this decade and limiting it to the cohesive infantry front. But even in the writings of the General Staff itself this limitation is not strictly adhered to, and the work thereby becomes involved in inner contradictions, in contradictions with King Frederick, and in contradictions with a document written personally by the chief of the Historical Section, von Taysen.
29.Tempelhof describes the approach march as follows：
There was no more beautiful sight. The heads of the columns were constantly abreast of one another and separated from one another by the distance necessary for the deployment; the platoons maintained their intervals as exactly as if they were marching in a review.”
30.As a reason for the echeloned attack, he states that, as a result of this formation, no special command was needed for the left wing to move into the battle. The interval of the individual battalions from one another amounted to fifty paces—that is, not even 1 minute"s march. The forward point of the right wing had a distance of 1，000 paces from the tail of the left wing, or no more than 10 to 15 minutes of marching time.
That it was not the echelons that brought victory was also recognized by Dietrich von Bülow（Jähns，3：2139）. Major Jochim，“The Military Testament of the Great King”（“Das militärische Testament des Grossen Königs”），supplement to the Militär-Wochenblatt, Vol.7，1914，claims, contrary to the General Staff Work, p.26，that the echelons were formed not by battalions but by brigades（five battalions）. He regards the oblique battle formation not as a combat formation at all, but rather as a movement formation, and he decisively rejects the traditional exaggerated estimate of its value. For him, the oblique battle formation was only an “expedient for the open plain with no cover.”According to the “Dispositions for the Battle of Zorndorf，” as printed in the Military Testament of Count Henckel Donnersmarck（Militärischer Nachlass des Grafen Henckel Donnersmarck），2：78，every two battalions together formed one echelon.
31.Letter of 8 August 1745. Generalstabswerk，“Wars of Frederick the Great”（“Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen”），1：24.
32.Kurt Schmidt，“The Activity of the Prussian Free Battalions in the First Two Campaigns of the Seven Years"War”（“Die Tätigkeit der preussischen Freibataillone in den beiden ersten Feldzügen des siebenjährigen Krieges”），Berlin dissertation，1911. Erwin Dette, op.cit.，p.78 ff. On Hardt"s successes in 1759，see Generalstabswerk，10：124.
33.Militär-Wochenblatt，62（1895）：1602；73（1899）：1832. The French ambassador Valory wrote in his report for 1748 concerning the Prussian cavalry at the time of the death of Frederick William I, Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，7：308：
The horses are accustomed to the fire, and the rider dismounts from his horse, leaving the bridle on his neck, and he places himself at the head of the squadron in order to fire by rank of platoons and of battalions like the infantryman, and no horse moves from his place. I have seen entire half-squadrons double their ranks fleeing from the horses"heels.
34.von Canitz, Information and Observations on the Fates of the Mounted Forces（Nachrichte und Betrachtungen über die Schicksale der Reiterei），p.7.
35.According to Desbrière and Sautai, Organisation et tactique des trois armes, Paris，1906.
36.Writings（Schriften），2：176.
37.Kavalleristische Monatshefte，1908，p.908，“On the Details and Results of Mounted Clashes”（“Ueber Verlauf and Ergebnis von Reiterzusammenstössen”）.
5 战略
1.It will be worth the trouble to note that, hand in hand with the new period of strategy, there also appeared the use of an aid that became increasingly important with the passage of time, the use of maps.Jovius relates that before the battle of Marignano in 1515 there were laid out for the Swiss leaders in the castle of Milan parchment sheets on which were drawn the roads and adjoining areas."Membranae in medium prolatae, quibus mensurae itinerum et regionis situs pictura describebantur, ut agreste ingenio homines certius deliberata cognoscerent.”（“Parchments were published, on which the distances of the routes and a picture of the structure of the region were drawn, so that even men with untrained ability might know the plans more definitely.”）It is noteworthy that in this way attempts were made to assist the peasants"lack of education.
2.Jähns，2：1151.
3.“He who has the last piece of bread and the last crown is victorious.”Gaspard（Jean）de Saulx-Tavannes, Mémoires, Ed. Buchon，1836.p.226. Mendoza, p.11：“Consequently, it is customarily said that the last crown or penny holds the victory.”
When Frederick planned to begin the war in 1756，he estimated that each campaign would cost him 5 million talers and that Prussia together with Saxony, which he planned to conquer, could afford that. The expenses increased, however, to 15 million talers annually, and he had to request English subsidies. Maria Theresa waged war essentially with French subsidies, but in 1761 she had used up her resources so completely that even during the continuing war she reduced the army and discharged troops for reasons of economy.
4.These passages are to be found in “Frederick the Great"s Ideas on War”（“Friedrichs des Grossen Anschauungen vom Kriege”），Vol.27 of the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, p.268.
5.Jochim，“The Military Testament of the Great King”（“Das militärische Testament des Grossen Königs”），supplement to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1914，pp.269，278.
6.Lenz, Historische Zeitschrift，49：458.
7.Schmalkaldic War（Schmalkaldischer Krieg），German edition，1853，p.90.
8.Even before the start of the Schmalkaldic War, the Venetian ambassador reported that the emperor would not fight any battle. In this connection he noted:“... Protestants do not have captains ... the German nation alone is not suitable to do battle on its own with determination, and the emperor will avoid that but will probe and encircle the enemy army with his light cavalry, and with the Italian infantry（which is experienced in the business of war）he will attempt to drive them back, wear them out, and annihilate them.”Bern.Navagero, Report from Germany of July 1546（Relation aus Deutschland vom Juli 1546），Ed. Albèri, Series 1，1：362.
9.Viktor Löwe, The Organization and Administration of Wallenstein"s Armies（Die Organisation und Verwaltung der Wallensteinschen Heere），1895. Reviewed by Schrötter in Schmollers Jahrbücher，1895，Vol.19，Book 4，p.327. Konze，“The Strengths etc.of Wallenstein"s Army in 1633”（“Die Stärke usw der Wallensteinschen Armee im Jahre 1633”），Bonn dissertation，1906. Hoeniger，“The Armies of the Thirty Years"War”（“Die Armeen des 30jährigen Krieges”），supplement to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1914，Vol.7，claims that at the climax of the war, when Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein stood facing one another, on both sides together there was a total of between 260，000 and 280，000 men under arms. That estimate is certainly somewhat high. Hoeniger gave too high a strength to the armies, especially at Nuremberg.
10.According to Deuticke, Schlacht bei Lützen, p.52.
11.For the train and rations among the Swiss, see Elgger, Military System of the Swiss（Kriegswesen der Schweizer），p.117 ff.
12.Jähns, pp.502，505.
13.Jähns, p.521.
14.Knaake, Contributions to the History of Emperor Charles V（Beiträge zur Geschichte Kaiser Karls V.），Stendal，1864，p.11.
15.Spont, Revue des questions d"histoire，22（1899）：63.
16.See also Rudolf Schmidt, Schlacht bei Wittstock, p.49. Letter of Field Marshal Hatzfeld. Also p.57.
17.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，78：487. In 1757，when Cumberland"s army was marauding because of a shortage of rations, he ordered that the high provost was to have hanged without ceremony every soldier caught in the act. A priest accompanied him as he rode about, in order to comfort the poor sinners before they went to hell. Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，77：478.
18.Montecuccoli, Writings（Schriften），2：122，states that in 1648 the Swedes held nine fortresses in Silesia. They had won them very easily, since they were not occupied, and they had then developed the insignificant older works. For this reason Montecuccoli advises that one should demolish all the old, unimportant fortresses and hold only a few really good fortresses, or have only open cities. He anticipates garrisons of only 100 to 500 men, except for Prague, which was to have 1，500. On page 135 he explains how the many fortresses were detrimental to the Spaniards in the Netherlands because they could not satisfactorily occupy and feed all of them, whereas they were useful for the Netherlanders because they were naturally strong positions and the inhabitants themselves provided the necessary defenders.
19.Printed in the Preussische Jahrbücher，153（1913）：423.
20.Henckel, Military Testament（Militärischer Nachlass），2：79.
21.This is excellently described in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：364. On 23 December 1757 Colonel Marainville reported of Frederick"s tactics:“... he does not follow up his advantages. When he wins battles, he limits himself almost always to possession of the battlefield.”Quoted in Stuhr, Research and Clarifications of the History of the Seven Years"War（Forschungen und Erläuterungen zur Geschichte des 7jährigen Krieges），1：387.
22.This, too, is excellently described in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：353.
23.Details on winter quarters or winter campaigns in Frederick"s General-Prinzipien, Articles 27 and 28.
24.Here, too, as we have already seen above in the quotation from Höpfner（p.279），is a reason for the oblique battle formation.
25.Archives of Orange-Nassau，2d Series，2：378.
26.Quoted in Krebs, Battle on the White Mountain（Schlacht am weissen Berge），p.12.
27.The Campaigns of Prince Eugene（Die Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen），1：1：587.
28.According to the citation in Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：385.
29.Letter to Louis XV dated 12 July 1744. Letter to the prince of Prussia forwarding the General-Prinzipien.
6 战略概述及战例介绍
1.All the previous descriptions of this campaign and of the battle have been significantly corrected by the careful study with its critical analysis of the sources by Rudolf Israel，“The Campaign of 1704 in South Germany”（“Der Feldzug von 1704 in Süddeutschland”），Berlin dissertation，1913.
2.Of course, Tallart intended to attack the allies as soon as they had crossed through the mist moving across his front, and he also made a few movements toward attacking in the battle. But in view of the formation of his troops, especially the unusually strong occupation of Blindheim and the lack of a reserve, we can still say that the battle was planned as a purely defensive action.
3.The battle was first completely explained in its strategic as well as tactical sequence by Georg Schmoller，“The Campaign of 1706 in Italy”（“Der Feldzug von 1706 in Italien”），Berlin dissertation，1909.
4.Schmoller, pp.35-36，“The Hussars in front of the two Echelons of Cavalry.”
5.Franz Mühlhoff，“The Genesis of the Battle of Oudenarde”（“Die Genesis der Schlacht bei Oudenaarde”），Berlin dissertation，1914.
6.In Coxe, Life and Correspondence of Marlborough（Leben und Briefwechsel Marlboroughs）.
7.The battle is treated excellently in the 1912 Berlin dissertation by Walter Schwerdtfeger. It is to be noted particularly that the account by Rüstow in the Geschichte der Infanterie is corrected and expanded in very important points by this study. Sautai, too, Bataille de Malplaquet（1906），had already rejected Rüstow"s account.
8.The wars of Frederick the Great have recently been treated comprehensively by both the Prussian and the Austrian general staffs. The Prussian work suffers from a false basic concept of the strategy of the period, which has also presented many details in a false light. The two general staff works have been compared in an excellent article by Otto Herrmann in the Jahrbücher für die Armee und Marine, January，1906.
9.The Generalstabswerk, p.392，states that the opposing strengths in the battle were “not significantly different from one another，” but it estimates the Prussian infantry 1，200 men too low and the Austrian cavalry 1，800 horses too high. Furthermore, it does not at all take into consideration the fact that the Prussians also had 1，400 cavalry in position in the rear of the Austrians at Ohlau, who could be counted on to intervene in the battle, and also a corps of seven battalions and six squadrons, as well as five squadrons from the homeland.
10.In the introduction to the second volume of the Gen-eralstabswerk, the unsatisfactory exploitation of the Prussian victory is retroactively explained by the “heavy losses of troops, which influenced most deeply the commander"s easily excited spirit” and similar reasons, but the great numerical superiority of the Prussians remains unmentioned.
11.How important this viewpoint was for Frederick is explained by Senftner，“Saxony and Prussia in 1741”（“Sachsen und Preussen im Jahre 1741”），Berlin dissertation，1904.
12.Monograph by Paul Müller. Berlin dissertation，1905. According to the Austrian Generalstabswerk，3：670，Frederick did not push his success to a complete victory because for political reasons he wished to spare Austria. That would be the direct opposite of the strategy that is normally attributed to Frederick, but it seems to me to go too far when it draws the political motive into the tactical action. It was sufficient that the victory was not further pursued strategically. The Generalstabswerk is to be compared with the very different account in Koser, Friedrich der Grosse, and Bleich，“The Moravian Campaign，1741-42”（“Der mährische Feldzug 1741-42”），Rostock dissertation，1901. I agree with Koser with respect to the facts, but I evaluate them very differently from the strategic viewpoint. Bleich, too, has not yet hit upon the correct points of view.
13.The account of the battle in the Generalstabswerk has been corrected in many respects, including the army strengths, in the comprehensive monograph by Rudolf Keibel（1899）. The reproach concerning the unsatisfactory pursuit that is directed against the king in the Generalstabswerk is rejected by Oskar Schulz in “Frederick"s Campaign after the Battle of Hohenfriedberg up to the Eve of the Battle of Soor”（“Der Feldzug Friedrichs nach der Schlacht bei Hohenfriedberg bis zum Vorabend der Schlacht bei Soor”），Heidelberg dissertation，1901.
14.In this saying lies the key to understanding the battle of Soor, which, although it was already correctly recognized by Clausewitz（10：30），is missing in the Generalstabswerk. Hans Stabenow，“Die Schlacht bei Soor，”Berlin dissertation，1901.
15.This point has been strongly confirmed in detail by Hans Kania，“The Conduct of Prince Leopold before the Battle of Kesselsdorf”（“Das Verhalten des Fürsten Leopold vor der Schlacht bei Kesselsdorf”），Berlin dissertation，1901.
16.Iwan Jowanowitsch，“Why Did Frederick the Great not Participate in the Battle of Kesselsdorf?”（“Warum hat Friedrich der Grosse an der Schlacht bei Kesselsdorf nicht teilgenommen?”），Berlin dissertation，1901.
17.Hobohm，“Torstensson as Predecessor of Frederick the Great in the Struggle Against Austria”（“Torstensson als Vorgänger Friedrichs des Grossen im Kampf gegen Oesterreich”），Preussische Jahrbücher，153：423 ff.
18.Monograph by Paul Gantzer in the Mitteilungen des Vereins der Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen, Vol.43（1905）.
19.Clausewitz, Werke，9：6.
20.Hobohm, p.436.
21.Sarauw, The Campaigns of Charles XII（Die Feldzüge Karls XII.），1881，p.192.
22.Franz Quandt，“Die Schlacht bei Lobositz，”Berlin dissertation，1909. The Generalstabswerk still does not present things correctly.
23.Karl Grawe，“The Development of the Prussian Campaign Plan in the Spring of 1757”（“Die Entwicklung des preussischen Feldzugsplanes im Frühjahr 1757”），Berlin dissertation，1903. This work, which in other respects develops the sequence correctly, makes the mistake of simply naming Leitmeritz as a march objective in the king"s order to Schwerin of 3 April, whereas both Melnik and, on 17 April, Reudnitz are named.
24.That has already been proved in an outstanding way by Caemmerer, Frederick the Great"s Campaign Plan for the Year 1757（Friedrichs des Grossen Feldzugsplan für das Jahr 1757），1883，which, in other respects, challenges my concept.
25.Jany, Documentary Contributions and Studies on the History of the Prussian Army（Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des preussischen Heeres），published by the Great General Staff，3（1901）：35.
26.The opposite concept was represented principally by Albert Naudé，whose arguments have been thoroughly refuted by me in the Preussische Jahrbücher，73：151；74：570（1893）. See in this connection the article by Gustav Roloff in the Deutsche Heereszeitung, Nos.42 and 43，1894.
27.Credit for having clarified these conditions goes to Dietrich Goslich，“Die Schlacht bei Kollin，”Berlin dissertation，1911. See also the review in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung of 1 May 1915，No.18. See also Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine, March 1912，p.336. If in this article the author, Jany, jokingly refers to Frederick"s concern for his depot as the loss of “flour sacks，” which could not be compared with the gains from a battle, he misunderstands a basic principle of the Prussian military system and Frederick"s strategy. For Napoleon, the proposal not to fight at Kollin but to allow Daun to approach still closer was simple and natural. Nothing is more characteristic of Frederick than that from the start he rejected this idea because of his concern for his rations. This point is developed very well by Goslich and misunderstood by Jany.
More recently, there has appeared an Austrian account of the battle by von Hoen, Vienna（1911），which confirms Goslich"s conclusions from the Austrian sources and adds some very interesting new points. A critical review of this work that presents an excellent picture has been given by Otto Herrmann in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，16（1913）：145.
28.Gerber, Die Schlacht bei Leuthen, Berlin，1901，has the right concept. The Generalstabswerk is off base in many respects.
29.Arneth，5：172.
30.Masslowski, The Seven Years"War from the Russian Viewpoint（Der siebenjährige Krieg nach russischer Darstellung），pp.175，180.
31.The considerations that Frederick mentions in his General-Prinzipien（1748）to the effect that it was generally more advantageous for him to attack Moravia rather than Bohemia, are based on the assumption that Saxony was not in his possession. This point is explained excellently in the study by Otto Herrmann in the Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine, Vol.121. The Generalstabswerk, in the volume devoted to the year 1758，also abandons the concept that is still represented in the first volumes. Its discussions are filled out in a very valuable way in an article by Otto Herrmann in the Historische Vierteljahres-Schrift，1912，Vol.1. Later, the king stated that the invasion of Moravia was particularly advantageous, also under the assumption that he had possession of Saxony. Such considerations naturally have no theoretical significance. They are geographical and topographical studies that are made by every strategy in all periods, and necessarily so. In particular, the fact that Vienna was threatened more strongly from Moravia than from Bohemia is not a consideration of the strategy of annihilation, for example, but of the strategy of attrition, for the former does not plan to threaten the enemy capital but to conquer it.
32.When Frederick was in Moravia, he had 55，000 men there, some 17，000 in Silesia，22，000 in Saxony, and 22，000 under Dohna, as well as several thousand sick. The normal statement that he was almost as strong as in 1757 is therefore not correct.
33.The Generalstabswerk reports this withdrawal twice. On page 92 the Prussians moved back before Daun"s approach march. On page 106 they were called back because the king planned to lift the siege.
34.Retzow，1：293.
35.Unpublished Reports（Ungedruckte Nachrichten），2：367. Bernhardt 1：243，has the credit for calling attention to this unique report from the diary of a junior officer. But when he adds，“No one knew how to go about requisitions，” he is unfair to the resourcefulness and intelligence of Frederick and his officers.
36.Retzow, p.294，does say expressly，“The losses in men, cannon, munitions, and rations were considerable，” but we must nevertheless take into account on the other hand that Frederick had taken much of the provisions for his army from enemy territory. In Bohemia contributions were even forced. Ungedruckte Nachrichten，2：367.
37.Generalstabswerk，7：232.
38.Arneth，5：388.
39.The newest study, based on the Generalstabswerk, is the article by Laubert in the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，25（1913）：91.
40.The Generalstabswerk estimates the strength of the combined Russians and Austrians in the battle as 79，000，while Koser estimates only between 68，000 and 69，000 men，16，000 of whom were irregulars. The Generalstabswerk gives Frederick 49，900 men, of whom the troops who covered the bridges and garrisoned Frankfurt were estimated as some 7，000 men.Koser"s statement（2：25），to the effect that 53，121 men were counted at the crossing of the Oder, contradicts p.37，where only 49，000 men are given. The origin of this error has already been discovered by Laubert, Die Schlacht bei Kunersdorf, p.52.
41.This argumentation appears again and again in Masslowski, Der Siebenjährige Krieg nach russischer Darstellung（translated by Drygalski）.
42.Clausewitz claimed to find this lack of caution so extreme that it was “hardly possible to explain it, to say nothing of excusing it.” The explanation is found in the study by Ludwig Mollwo, Marburg dissertation，1893. It is to be found in the concept of the “unassailable position，” so characteristic of that period. The king assumed as certain that the Austrians were about to evacuate Saxony and that they would not attack. But Daun recognized his advantage, summoned up his courage, attacked Finck, and overpowered him with his large superiority, and that all the more easily since the Prussian troops consisted partially of captured Russians who had come over to their service and impressed Saxons.
43.In the Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，2（1889）：263，Herrmann published a letter from Gaudy to Prince Henry, dated 11 December 1760，in which he says that “unfortunate cannon shots” were the cause of the premature attack. He says that the cavalry and artillery were also not yet in place.
44.Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，78：137.
45.Arneth，6：259.
46.On 30 June Tschernyscheff"s Russian corps joined forces with the Prussians, and on 1 July the advance of the combined armies began. On 18 July came the news of the abdication of Czar Peter.During this time Frederick could have fought a battle with considerable superiority, if he had planned for it. But he planned to do so only in case the Austrians would have been obliged to detach a part of their army against the Turks.
7 战略家腓特烈
1.This is very clearly described by General von Caemmerer in Defense and Weapons（Wehr und Waffen），2：101.
2.When the True Advice（Frundsberg）requires “10，000 foot soldiers，1，500 saddle horses, and appropriate field pieces” against a powerful enemy, that, too, has the flavor of a “normal army.”
3.Susane, Histoire de l"infanterie française，1：106.
4.Collected Writings（Gesammelte Schriften），1：327，364.
5.Essai général de Tactique，2：41，Ed.of 1772.
6.Jähns，3：2861.
7.Bülow, Spirit of the Newer Military System（Geist des neueren Kriegssystems），p.209.
8.In the General-Prinzipien（1748）in the article on the campaign plans. In the “Réflexions sur la tactique”（1758），Oeuvres，28：155. To Prince Henry, dated 8 March 1760，15 November 1760，21 April 1761，24 May 1761，15 June 1761. In the introduction to the History of the Seven Years"War（Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges）.
Marlborough wrote in a similar way to his friend Godolphin after his victory at Oudenarde, saying that if it had not been absolutely necessary, he would have avoided exposing himself to the dangerous chances of a battle. Coxe, Marlborough, Life and Letters.
9.For example, on 15 and 16 August 1761，where, with considerable superiority, he could have attacked a Russian corps. Bernhardi, Friedrich der Grosse als Feldherr，2：358 ff.，describes the situation very clearly and finds the explanation only in a kind of mood, that is, that the king had determined to fight the Austrians, and not the Russians in an open battle.
10.Guibert, Essai général de tactique，1：33：“Everywhere that the king of Prussia could maneuver, he had successes. Almost everywhere that he was forced to do battle, he was beaten—events that prove to what extent his troops were superior in tactics, even if they were not in courage.”
第四篇 国民军时代
1 革命与入侵
1.Contributions to the Art of War（Beyträge zur Kriegskunst），Vol.II, foreword.
2.General Lloyd"s Treatise on the General Principles of the Art of War（Des H. General von Lloyds Abhandlung über die allgemeinen Grundsätze der Kriegskunst），German edition, p.18.
3.Frederick wrote to Fouqué in 1758：“Cannon fire and musket fire upward from a lower position have no effect, and to attack the enemy with firing from below means fighting against weapons with sticks; it is impossible.”
4.The decisive statements by Bülow are collected in Caemmerer, The Development of the Science of Strategy in the Nineteenth Century（Die Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19.Jahrhundert），1904，but not enough attention is given to the fact that a number of Bülow"s disputed statements are very similar to some that appear in the writings of Frederick the Great.
5.Geschichte der Kriegskunst，2：949.
6.E.Daniels，“Ferdinand von Braunschweig，”Preussische Jahrbücher, Vols.77-80，82.
2 革命军
1.De la Jonquière, La Bataille de Jemappes, Paris，1902，gives the Austrians 16，000 men on page 124，but a bare 14，000 men on page 143；on page 146 Dumouriez is said to have had between 40，000 and 42，00®men, including Harville"s corps, which provided important cooperation.
2.The results of the February recruiting were estimated at 180，000 men, while the levée en masse of August produced between 425，000 and 450，000. Kuhl, Bonaparte"s First Campaign（Bonapartes erster Feldzug），pp.32-33.
3.According to the apparently generally reliable description by Duruy in the memoirs of Barras.
4.Of course, other judgments concerning the newly formed French officer corps read in quite the opposite way; for example, von der Marwitz, Autobiography（Lebensbeschreibung），edited by Meusel，1：459.
5.According to the Wars of Frederick the Great（Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen）by the Great General Staff, Vol.1，Supplement No.2，p.38，that had already been the case in 1740.
6.Lehmann, Scharnhorst，2：147.
7.Supplements to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1901，p.436.
8.That is correctly given strong emphasis by Caemmerer, The Development of the Strategic Science in the Nineteenth Century（Die Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19.Jahrhundert），1904，Chap.2.
9.Klippel, Life of Scharnhorst（Leben Scharnhorsts），1：44，note. The agreement in principle expressed here was nevertheless very limited from a practical viewpoint, according to Lehmann, Scharnhorst，1：51.
10.Jähns，3：2588.
11.Certainly with accuracy.Kuhl, p.43.
12.A particularly valuable witness is Duhesme, who participated in the wars of the revolution from the start and in 1814，as a lieutenant general, published a book, Essay on the Light Infantry（Essai sur l"infanterie légère），which he had begun to write in 1805. He shows that skirmishing was accepted only as an expedient, and on p.114 he says that in 1793 the entire French infantry had adopted the combat method of the light infantry. This point is not expressed entirely appropriately, since, of course, the new combat method consisted not only of skirmishing but also of the following assault columns, which did not belong to the nature of the light infantry.
13.The quotations are from Kuhl, p.44.
14.Hermann Giehrl reports very clearly and accurately from the sources concerning other branches of Napoleon"s military activity in his work General Napoleon as an Organizer（Der Feldherr Napoleon als Organisator），Observations on His Means of Transport and Communications, His Methods of Working and Command, Berlin, E. S. Mittler and Son，1911.
15.2：360.
16.Reprinted in Klippel，3：40.
17.In a thorough study，“The Expenditure of Manpower in the Principal Battles of the Last Centuries”（“Der Menschenverbrauch in den Hauptschlachten der letzten Jahrhunderte”），Preussische Jahrbücher，72（1893）：105，Gustav Roloff established a wavelike falling and rising of the casualty figures since the seventeenth century, in which various factors（weapons, tactics, strategy）work together and in opposition to one another.
18.Freytag-Loringhoven, Napoleon"s Military Leadership（Die Heerführung Napoleons），p.43，estimated for 1809“hardly more than one and a half cannon for 1，000 men，” and for 1812 he estimates three and a half.
19.Caemmerer, History of Strategic Science（Geschichte der strategischen Wissenschaft），p.14 f.，from Colin, L"Education militaire de Napoléon.
20.Caemmerer gives a masterful survey of the difference in battle leadership between Frederick and Napoleon in Defense and Weapons（Wehr und Waffen），2：100 ff.，especially p.108.
21.According to Lehmann, Scharnhorst，2：149.
22.History of the Infantry（Geschichte der Infanterie），2：296.
23.Compare Gneisenau"s statement to York on the evening of the battle on the Katzbach. Delbrück, Life of Gneisenau（Leben Gneisenaus），1：342. On 24 October 1805 Napoleon wrote in Augsburg to the general intendant of the army, Petit, that he had necessarily operated without depots but despite the favorable season and the repeated victories, the soldiers had suffered a great deal.“In a season when there were no potatoes in the fields, or if the army experienced some reverses, the lack of depots would lead to the greatest misfortunes.”
24.Lauriston to the major general，25 May 1813：
I must call the attention of Your Highness to the march of the troops. The lack of supplies since several days causes the soldier to dare everything in order to procure rations. There are definitely fewer stragglers than there are men who move out ahead at the moment they sight some town or village. The generals make every effort to stop this disorder; the small number of officers paralyzes these measures, especially because the officers themselves are looking for foodstuffs（Rousset, La grande armée de 1813）.
The connection between discipline and regular rations is indicated very well in a corps order by Blücher（drawn up by Gneisenau）of 8 May 1813：“In order to maintain our discipline we must be sure to impress on the soldier on the one hand that we are using every measure at our disposal to satisfy his needs, but on the other hand we must also observe a strict economy.” And it goes on to say:“... so that the soldier is completely convinced of the concern of his superiors ...”Reported in the “Life of Reiher”（“Leben Reihers”），Supplements to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1861，p.84.
25.von Lettow-Vorbeck，“The French Conscription under Napoleon I”）（“Die französische Konskription unter Napoleon I.”），Supplements to the Militär-Wochenblatt，1892，Book 3.
3 拿破仑的战略
1.Napoleon as Commander（Napoleon als Feldherr），by Count York, is a popular and frequently read book, and I have taken points here and there from it; nevertheless, its most important points must be rejected. The author depends, to his detriment, more on Jomini than on Clausewitz. It is as if the old Gneisenau-York antagonism once more was expressed here, as if the grandson of General York was unwilling to recognize the friend and disciple of Gneisenau, Clausewitz. His study of the sources is often insufficient, and we must particularly reject the idea that Napoleon"s power was declining from 1809 on and that he fell because of his own doings. A principal passage that he cites as proof（2：95，letter to Clarke of 21 August 1809）is based on an erroneous translation. Napoleon does not say that one may be allowed to fight a battle only “when one has no new turn of fortune to hope for，” but that one should not fight as long as one can hope that the chances of success will still increase. See note 4，below.
2.Thoughts and General Rules for War（Pensées et règles générals pour la guerre），1755. Article：“Projets de campagne.”
3.See p.313 above; further, to Winterfeld，5 August 1757：“I intended to march between Reichenbach and Bernstädtel in order to cause him（the enemy）jealousy over Görlitz; if this works, that will be good, but if he is unwilling to move from Zittau, I will be forced to attack him where I find him. I do not know anything else to do.”
4.To the minister of war, Clarke，21 August 1809：“... that battles should not take place if one cannot estimate in his favor 70 chances for success out of 100，even that one may fight a battle only when one has no new chances to expect, since by its nature the outcome of a battle is always doubtful; but once the decision is made, one must conquer or perish.”
5.To Prince Henry，8 March 1760.
6.The passages in which Napoleon expresses himself in favor of keeping all his troops assembled before the battle are collected in an excellent study by Balck，“Napoleonic Preparation for Battle and Battle Leadership”（“Napoleonische Schlachtenanlage und Schlachtenleitung”），supplements to the Militär-Wochenblatt, Book 2，1901.
7.Similarly in Oeuvres XXIX, pp.70，78，91，143.“Réflexions sur les projets de campagne，”1775.“Exposé sur le gouvernement prussien，”1776.“Réflexions sur les mesures à prendre au cas d"une guerre nouvelle avec les Autrichiens，”（“Reflections on the Measures to Be Taken in Case of a New War with the Austrians”），1779.
8.For the details, the reader is referred to “Studies on the First Phase of the Campaign of 1796 in Italy”（“Studien zur ersten Phase des Feldzuges von 1796 in Italien”），by Erich Eckstorff, Berlin dissertation，1901，where the completely false accounts by Jomini and Count York are refuted and an error by Clausewitz is also corrected.
9.The three quotations are from Kuhl, Bonaparte"s First Campaign，1796（Bonapartes erster Feldzug，1796），Berlin，1902，p.319.
10.Letter to Field Marshal Lehwaldt of 16 April 1757.
11.The French historians, for example, Martin and Thiers, find Napoleon"s judgment to be inspired by his own self-love, which was not willing to recognize anybody on a par with him. It may be that such a feeling had something to do with this somewhat disparaging expression. But that Moreau, in contrast to Bonaparte, was “methodical” is conceded even by his admirers, or if one wishes, it is pointed out by them; for example, in a study in the Parisian war archives（Dépôt de la guerre）of 1829. Quoted by Lort de Sérignan, p.212.
12.Wiehr, Napoleon and Bernadotte in the Autumn Campaign of 1813（Napoleon und Bernadotte im Herbstfeldzug 1813），p.61.
13.The comparison between the strategy of Moreau and that of Napoleon was correctly presented for the first time in the two dissertationsTheodor Eggerking，“Moreau as Commander in the Campaigns of 1796 and 1799”（“Moreau als Feldherr in den Feldzügen 1796 und 1799”），Berlin，1914；and Siegfried Mette，“Napoleon and Moreau in Their Plans for the Campaign of 1800”（“Napoleon und Moreau in ihren Plänen für den Feldzug von 1800”），Berlin, R. Trenkel，1915. Alfred Herrmann"s work, Marengo, Münster，1903，is interesting but at times overcritical, and it often sees errors in Napoleon"s conduct of war precisely in those places where his greatness actually lies. See in this connection the review by E. Daniels, Preussische Jahrbücher，116：347. The correct concept of the campaign, based most appropriately on the sources, is to be found in the work by Major De Cugnac, La campagne de Marengo, Paris，1904. Review by von Caemmerer, Militärische Literaturzeitschrift 2（1905）：86.
We learn about Moreau in 1813 from his conversation with Bernadotte in the Collection of the Orders of Charles John, Royal Prince of Sweden（Recueil des ordres de Charles Jean, Prince royal de Suède），Stockholm，1838，p.11. He did not exercise a noticeable influence.
14.Even in the book Napoléon et les grands généraux de la révolution et de l"empire, by Lort de Sérignan, Paris，1914，despite the generally correct orientation, the really important aspect of the problem is still not yet grasped. The author considers only Davout as a complete disciple of Napoleon. He considers Lecourbe, Desaix, and St. Cyr as disciples of Moreau. The frequently expressed statement, which is also accepted by Sérignan, that Napoleon formed no disciples but only tools, I would like to reject expressly.
15.These passages are from the Basic Principles of Strategy（Grundsätze der Strategie），1813.
16.The theories and writings of the archduke are treated excellently by Heinrich Ommen in The Conduct of War of Archduke Charles（Die Kriegführung des Erzherzogs Karl），Berlin, E.Ebering，1900. The army organization, tactics, rations system, and so on, are also treated very clearly in this work. In his discussion of strategy, however, Ommen makes a mistake. He understands the old strategy too much as a simple strategy of maneuver, which it became only in those cases where it stiffened, and he therefore brings the archduke into an opposition to that strategy, an opposition which did not actually exist（p.13）. See W. Kraus，“Die Strategie des Erzherzogs Karl 1796，”Berlin dissertation，1913.
17.Rühle von Lilienstern, Report of an Eyewitness of the Campaign of Prince Hohenlohe（Bericht eines Augenzeugen vom Feldzug des Fürsten Hohenlohe），1807，1：63.
18.See my article “Erzherzog Carl” in the Recollections（Erinnerungen），p.590. See also in this connection Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften，27：380，where older theoreticians are cited, whose teachings were adopted by the archduke.
19.August Menge, The Battle of Aspern（Die Schlacht bei Aspern），Berlin, Georg Stilke，1900. Holtzheimer，“Schlacht bei Wagram，”Berlin dissertation，1904. In his book Napoleon as Commander，2：247，Count York compared Napoleon with Frederick and Archduke Charles in the following manner：
If the Napoleonic strategy possessed a grandeur in its plans and a boldness in its execution that I, at least, cannot recognize to the same degree in Frederick or Archduke Charles, on the other hand the behavior of the latter two does not show the decline from the earlier summit; they remained true to their own conduct, even if this never reached the full military greatness of the Napoleonic.
This kind of comparison must be rejected in every respect. Neither did Napoleon decline from his summit, nor may the archduke be compared with Frederick in this way, nor may the difference in their epochs be ignored in the comparison between Napoleon and Frederick, nor may the change in Frederick himself be left out of consideration. If one claimed to measure strategists only by the “grandeur of their plans and the boldness in their execution，” then of course it would be precisely Frederick who “declined from his summit.”
20.In conjunction with this battle, Napoleon once developed for an Austrian officer the difference between his conduct of battle and that of the Austrians（quoted, for example, in Knesebecks Trilogie, and in Ranke, in “Hardenberg，”Werke，48：125）. Ranke finds that it is a generalized description of the second day of Wagram. The passage here reads as follows：
You normally move forward in small corps that are brought together as a whole by your battle plan; you make your dispositions on the day before the battle, when you do not yet know the enemy"s maneuver. In doing so, you can only take into account the terrain. I do not deploy before the battle; during the night before the battle I keep my troops carefully assembled. At the first rays of the sun, I reconnoiter the enemy. As soon as I am informed about his movements, I make my dispositions, but they are based more on the enemy than on the terrain.
I cannot find that in this point Napoleon hit precisely on the difference between the French and the Austrians. It is rather the difference between the offensive battle and the defensive that he portrays. For that reason it is applicable to the battle of Wagram. At Austerlitz, however, Napoleon, too, made his battle plan on the preceding day and deployed his troops in conformance with the terrain. If there was on the other side no commander who waited until the morning of the battle to order the approach march and the attack, but instead the general staff provided for a detailed disposition, that still does not mean that the important and decisive difference of the opposing arrangements is to be found precisely in this point.
21.On 11 October 1805 Napoleon had Berthier write to Marmont as follows：
In all the letters that General Marmont writes me, he speaks to me about rations. I repeat to him that in the wars of movement and invasion that the emperor is waging there are no depots; it is the business of the commanding generals of the corps to provide for themselves the means of feeding the troops in the areas through which they march.
On 8 July 1812 word was sent to Poniatowski that His Majesty was very dissatisfied to see that he spoke of pay and bread when it was a question of pursuing the enemy.
22.The account in my Gneisenau is supplemented by an article “General Wolseley on Napoleon, Wellington and Gneisenau” in my Recollections, Articles, and Speeches（Erinnerungen, Aufsätze, und Reden）.
23.See “On the Difference, etc.”（“Ueber die Verschiedenheit, usw”）in my Historical and Political Esays（Historische und Politische Aufsätze），P.273；2d Ed, p.269 f.，and “Frederick, Napoleon, Moltke，”P.45，where it is explained that even when a battle was in prospect, as was actually the case in 1778，that did not change anything in the strategic basic character of the war plan. After all, there are also battles in the strategy of attrition.
24.Koser, Friedrich der Grosse，2：400（4th Ed.）understands it in this way：“In keeping with Frederick"s theory, the final decision in a war between Prussia and Austria would necessarily take place in Moravia.”A similar comment is on p.457. In another passage（p.585）it was quoted, on the other hand, that “the main blow was to be struck at the enemy by the capture of Prague，” from which he would not be able to recover. The error lies in the fact that a decisive significance is attributed to the question “Bohemia or Moravia?” as such. The significance, however varies according to the circumstances. As practice has indeed shown, on one occasion it is the one country, and on the other occasion the other country where it appears more advantageous to seek the decision. In theory, a campaign into Moravia offered many advantages, but they were not so great as to prevent Frederick very frequently from preferring to move into Bohemia.
4 沙恩霍斯特、格奈泽瑙、克劳塞维茨
1.Lehmann, Scharnhorst，1：254.
2.According to the supplement in Lehmann"s Scharnhorst，1：543，Prince Ferdinand of Braunschweig was perhaps the very first to express this idea of using the third rank for the skirmisher fight, when in January 1761 he commanded a general in the Hanoverian light troops to equip the third rank with grooved-bore muskets.
3.Documentary Contributions to the History of the Prussian Army（Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte des preussischen Heeres），Vol.5，“The Combat Training of the Prussian Infantry of 1806”（“Die Gefechtsausbildung der preussichen Infanterie von 1806”），by Jany，1903. Möllendorff"s order reads as follows：“The position of the musket must be shown to the men better, so that they no longer lean their head against the stock and aim, as formerly, but press the butt against the shoulder, holding the head upright, and thus hold the musket horizontally as His Majesty the King primarily reminded them and commanded at this year"s review.”In 1807 the Reorganization Commission recommended the “introduction of stocks more definitely curved, which make aiming possible.”Scherbening, The Reorganization of the Prussian Army（Die Reorganisation der preussischen Armee）.
4.Life of Gneisenau（Leben Gneisenaus），3d Ed.，1907. Supplemented by the article “New Information on 1813”（“Neues über 1813”），Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol.157，July，1914.“General von Clausewitz”；“The Prussian Officer Class”（“Der preussische Offizierstand”）—both articles in the Historical and Political Essays（Historische und politische Aufsätze），2d Ed.，1907.“On Max Lehmann"s Stein”（“Ueber Max Lehmanns Stein”），Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol.134，1908.“From Arminius to Scharnhorst”（“Von Armin bis Scharnhorst”），in the collection In Defense and Weapons（In Wehr und Waffen），edited by von Caemmerer and von Ardenne.
5.Very well explained by Ommen, The Conduct of War of Archduke Charles（Die Kriegführung des Erzherzogs Karl）.
6.The same thing is reported by Valory of the Prussian cavalry in 1742，Brandenburgisch-Preussische Forschungen，7：310. Valory wrote that an outstanding Prussian officer had told him that in the battle of Chotusitz, when the closely formed Prussian squadrons had reached the enemy, it was first necessary to shout to the men that they were to strike with their sabers. Frederick himself told the same thing to Count Gisors. Rousset, Le comte de Gisors, p.105.
7.According to A. Müffling, My Life（Mein Leben），p.31.
8.Fr.Meinecke, Life of Boyen（Leben Boyens）.
9.These instructions are from the year 1809，and they were then assembled as training regulations in 1812. As a continuation of the distinction between line infantry and light infantry, there still also remained the difference between the musketeer（or grenadier）battalions and the fusilier battalions, but this difference can be passed over, since it had no practical significance.
10.The history of the wars of liberation has in no work been at the same time more extensively developed and more confused than by the Memorable Recollections from the Life of the Imperial Russian General of Infantry Carl Frederick Count von Toll（Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des kaiserlichen russischen Generals der Infanterie Carl Friedrich Grafen von Toll）by Theodor von Bernhardi. The book is excellently written, the author is a competent military analyst, and the papers left by Toll provided him the most valuable material—it is no wonder that for a long time his judgment enjoyed an almost saintly respect. I, too, long deferred to his authority and only by laborious research learned to overcome his prejudice, point by point.
11.Critical extremists have also puttered around with this great deed. In addition to my Gneisenau, these have also been very well rejected by Caemmerer in The Wars of Liberation. A Strategic Survey（Die Befreiungskriege. Ein strategischer Ueberblick），1907.
[1]尼德兰（Netherlands）的意思就是低地，历史上大致包括今天的荷兰（正式国名为尼德兰）、比利时、卢森堡三国和德国的一部分。下文中的“荷兰”有时与尼德兰同义。
[2]本名皮埃尔·泰拉伊（Pierre Terrail），巴亚尔城堡领主（1473—1524），有“无可挑剔的骑士”之称，投靠法王查理八世后扬名于意大利战争。
[3]作者是第一代维耶维埃尔领主弗朗索瓦（1509—1571），法国官员和外交官，弗朗索瓦一世时期为御前顾问和元帅。
[4]埃尔（ell）是中世纪的布匹长度单位。
[5]如无特殊说明，本章及之后提到的“火器”（firearms）指的都是枪炮一类的管式火器，不包括手榴弹、地雷等同样利用火药爆炸能量的武器。
[6]即魔术弹。
[7]巴伐利亚军人（约1520—1575），曾效力于3位皇帝帐下，代表作是3卷本《兵书》（Kriegsbuch）。
[8]文艺复兴时期德意志数学家（1488—1552），任教于巴塞尔大学，以制作地图和教授宇宙学闻名。
[9]全名为弗朗索瓦·德拉努（1531—1591），法国胡格诺派首领和军人，著有《军政论集》（Discours politiques et militaires）一书。
[10]即勃兰登堡藩侯，因其有资格参与选举皇帝，故有“选帝侯”之称。
[11]全名阿尔布雷希特·瓦伦斯坦，又译华伦斯坦，波希米亚贵族，三十年战争（1618—1648）中帝国一方的杰出将领。
[12]这个词在现代指的是最高级军衔“元帅”，但若译为“元帅”，则不符合上下文和历史语境。前面的“团长”和“队长”也是类似的情况，对应现代的上校和上尉军衔，但此时是实际职务。
[13]全名加斯帕尔·德·科利尼（1519—1572），法国军人和政治家，法国宗教战争时期的胡格诺派领袖，最后死于天主教势力发动的圣巴托洛缪大屠杀。
[14]名为费尔南多·阿尔瓦雷斯·德·托莱多（Fernando Álvarez de Toledo），西班牙军事家，曾效力于查理五世皇帝、法国国王腓力二世等君主，曾残酷镇压弗兰德斯革命，以恐怖政策闻名。
[15]法国军人（约1537—1614），曾任布朗托姆修道院长，著有《风流传》（Vie des dames galantes）。
[16]即莱比锡。莱比锡是选帝侯萨克森公爵的首都，当时萨克森公国与皇帝站在一边，此战后被瑞典占领。
[17]1意大利里约1852米。
[18]文艺复兴时期的著名女诗人，法夫里希奥·科隆纳的女儿。
[19]查理五世的弟弟，时为波希米亚和匈牙利国王，后来成为皇帝。此处说的“姐妹”虽不确切，但应该是他的妹妹玛丽，她之前是匈牙利摄政，辅佐哥哥斐迪南，当时担任尼德兰总督。
[20]即佛罗伦萨民兵。佛罗伦萨共和国以佛罗伦萨城为基础，统治周边的托斯卡纳地区。
[21]古罗马名将法比乌斯也有同样的称号，他曾运用拖延战略击败了汉尼拔。
[22]罗马帝国开国君主奥古斯都的侄子，在政治和军事领域都野心勃勃，结果死在了意大利南部的一场伏击中。
[23]一位以聪明机智闻名的罗马裁缝。罗马城内有一座雕像名叫“帕斯奎诺”，自16世纪初成为市民张贴标语、表达见解的场所，它据说就得名于这位裁缝。
[24]本意就是方的阵形，但为了与步兵方阵做一区分，本书之后谈及骑兵时会用“方队”一词。
[25]阿尔喀比亚德是古希腊著名统帅，在这里是阿尔布雷希特的绰号。
[26]这两个词的字面意义都是“骑兵”“骑手”。
[27]胡格诺战争，又称法国宗教战争，是1562—1598年中天主教阵营与新教徒（胡格诺派）阵营之间发生的8次战争的统称。
[28]原文为prisoner’s base，一种盛行于中世纪的游戏。玩家分成两队，各有一个基地，目标是抓住离开基地的对方玩家。
[29]法国宗教战争中的军事家和政治家，曾代表天主教阵营大破新教军队，后来却被法国国王亨利三世设计杀害。
[30]按照本书的划分，马匹的步伐从慢到快可分为慢步（walk）、快步（trot）和袭步（gallop），各自内部又有细分，比如高速慢步、低速快步等。当然，其他划分方式也是有的。
[31]中世纪骑士需要掌握的六种技能，包括剑术、骑术、游泳、矛术、棋艺、吟诗。其他的说法也有，比如将矛术换成狩猎。
[32]波兰贵族，波兰名为扬（Jan），扎甘公爵扬一世幼子（扎甘是波兰的一个地区，波兰语中叫作“Żagań”），1477年因继承权纠纷而与阿尔布雷希特·阿喀琉斯开战。
[33]中文世界通称“奥兰治亲王威廉”，但Prince的头衔与亲王无关，只是某地领主的意思，持有者未必与皇帝或国王有亲缘关系。
[34]约翰是前面提到的拿骚伯爵威廉·路易的弟弟，他们的父亲去世后将领地分割，长子威廉·路易继承伯爵之位，其余四子各有领地。
[35]指的是帕尔马公爵亚历山大·法尔内塞，1578—1592年担任西属尼德兰总督。
[36]德意志法学家和历史学家（1605—1678），曾在古斯塔夫·阿道夫帐下服役。
[37]全名为蒂伊伯爵约翰·采克拉斯（Johann Tserclaes,Count of Tilly），生于1559年，死于1632年，三十年战争期间担任天主教联盟的统帅，从1620年以来多次击败新教军队，直到1631年在莱比锡附近的布赖滕费尔德惨败于古斯塔夫·阿道夫。
[38]1455—1485年间的英格兰内战，起因是兰开斯特家族与约克家族争夺王位。
[39]全名约翰·汉普登（John Hampden），议会军领袖，克伦威尔的堂兄，1643年战死。
[40]主张废除教阶、教区地方自治的英格兰教派，在内战和护国公时期地位显赫。
[41]普法尔茨选侯腓特烈五世的一个外号，指的是他曾在1619年8月至1620年11月短暂地当过波希米亚国王。
[42]全名为弗里茨·赫尼希（1848—1902），德国军官和军事作家。此语出自他的三卷本《奥利弗·克伦威尔》（Olivier Cromwell）。
[43]全名为查尔斯·哈定·弗思（1857—1936），英国历史学家。此语出自他的《克伦威尔的军队》（Cromwell’s Army）一书。
[44]全名路德维希·普费弗尔（1524—1594），瑞士步兵统领，瑞士联邦中的天主教利益代言人，是16世纪后半叶瑞士政界的关键人物。
[45]新教一方的萨克森-魏玛公国将领（1604—1639）。
[46]时为1556年。
[47]名为马克西米利安·德贝蒂讷（Maximilien de Béthune），第一代叙利公爵（1560—1641），法国宗教战争时期的胡格诺派大臣，亨利四世的得力助手。
[48]发生于1701—1714年。
[49]亨利三世于1574—1589年在位。
[50]德国历史上的一个国家，1618年勃兰登堡选侯通过联姻手段夺取了普鲁士王国的继承权，从此两国组成共主邦联。1701年，皇帝将普鲁士升格为王国，于是普鲁士王国取代了勃兰登堡-普鲁士的名号。
[51]名为腓特烈·威廉，是前一段提到的勃兰登堡选侯之子，1640—1688年在位。
[52]普鲁士王国的第二代国王，1713—1740年在位，绰号“士兵王”，他的父亲是勃兰登堡选侯腓特烈三世，建立王号后称腓特烈一世。不要将他与前文提到的腓特烈·威廉选侯混淆，后者是他的祖父。
[53]全名威廉·蒂利希（1571—1650），德国工程师和建筑师。
[54]德国讽刺小说，作者为格里美尔斯豪森，书中讲述了一名三十年战争中的小人物的人生悲喜剧。
[55]全名为格奥尔格·冯·德夫林格（1606—1695），勃兰登堡-普鲁士元帅，曾受大选侯腓特烈·威廉重用，但两人关系时好时坏。
[56]指的是一战前的沙俄。波兰在18世纪被俄国、普鲁士、奥地利瓜分。
[57]前身是17世纪德意志地区独立于教会学校的世俗学校，1717年普鲁士国王腓特烈·威廉一世推行以“国民学校”为名的义务教育，接收7岁至12岁的儿童。
[58]全名为格奥尔格·海因里希·冯·贝伦霍斯特（1733—1814），普鲁士军官，当时闻名的兵学家。
[59]“语法”（Grammatik）在德语中是阴性名词，所以定冠词应该用die，但这位将军用了阳性的定冠词der。
[60]德意志解放战争是1813年德意志各邦反对拿破仑统治的战争。七年战争发生于1756—1763年。
[61]普鲁士和奥地利争夺西里西亚的战争，分别发生于1744—1745年和1756—1763年。
[62]欧根指的是奥地利将军萨伏伊的欧根（1663—1736）。马尔伯勒指的是英国著名将领，第一代马尔伯勒公爵约翰·丘吉尔（1650—1722）。两人比腓特烈大帝（1712—1786）大致早两至三代人。
[63]全名利奥波德·约瑟夫·冯·道恩（1705—1766），奥地利王位继承战争和七年战争中的奥军元帅。
[64]特兰西瓦尼亚的德文名，今为罗马尼亚中西部。
[65]指的是卢森堡公爵弗朗索瓦-亨利（1628—1695），法国将军。
[66]希腊神话中的太阳神赫利俄斯之子，驾着父亲的太阳马车漫天乱窜，于是宙斯发出一道闪电，让他连人带车掉进了海里。
[67]又称曼图恩会战，英军凭借机枪击败了大举来攻的苏丹马赫迪军。
[68]即滑铁卢会战。
[69]这里是将沙恩霍斯特比作耶稣。约翰和彼得都是耶稣的门徒。约翰常被认为是耶稣“所爱的门徒”。彼得为教会的建立付出了许多心血，但耶稣被捕后曾3次不承认自己是耶稣的门徒，即“彼得不认主”。